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Private health insurance premiums in Australia are regulated by the Commonwealth 
Government.  Premium increases often well exceed the national consumer price index, 
which suggests that consumers are not receiving value for money for health insurance 
products.  The current regulatory framework does not encourage health insurers to 
minimise costs.  Health fund management costs are assessed relative to an average 
industry benchmark instead of industry best practice.  This paper examines the scope to 
reduce the premium increases under incentive regulation.  This type of regulation is used 
to set utility and transport prices in Australia.  Data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods 
are used to assess the potential efficiency and productivity gains for health funds.  This 
information is used to help set premiums for individual funds.  Our results suggest that 
incentive regulation could potentially reduce the average premium increase across all 
private health insurance products and health funds by about ½ per cent per annum. 
 
Keywords: Private health insurance, incentive regulation, productivity growth 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Commonwealth Government approves private health insurance premiums in 
Australia.  Premium increases over recent years have been well above the national 
consumer price index (CPI), which raises community concerns that consumers are not 
receiving value for money for private health insurance products. 
 
Frequent government policy changes (e.g., refinements to the private health insurance 
rebate and capping benefit payments for prostheses) and market initiatives to improve 
industry competitiveness and efficiency have belatedly helped to stem the growth in 
health insurance premiums.  Since 2001, the average premium increase for the various 
private health insurance products offered by the health insurers has been above 6 per cent 
in most years (PHIAC 2006a).  Over the last three years average premium increases have 
been lower but remain high relative to the CPI.  For example, the most recent average 
premium increase was 4.99 per cent (Roxon 2008a).  By comparison, the average annual 
CPI increase over 2000-01 to 2006-07 was 2.5 per cent (ABS 2008).  To some extent, the 
decline in premium increases was underpinned by the stronger returns from the health 
insurers’ investment portfolios.  Nevertheless, recent premium increases easily exceed the 
Reserve Bank of Australia’s inflation target of 2 to 3 per cent per annum for the 
economy.   
 
Containing future premium increases is a challenging exercise given the increased use of 
costly technology in medical procedures that often produce marginal improvements in 
patient health, the greater utilisation of health services by an ageing population, the 
incentives in the healthcare system that encourage doctors to prescribe additional 
treatments for patients, and the increased cost of pharmaceuticals (PHIAC 2007a;  
IC 1997).  Furthermore, to achieve further efficiency gains in the provision of health 
insurance products and services the private health insurance industry must address a 
highly fragmented market structure.  
 
The previous Commonwealth Government introduced policies to encourage people to 
purchase health insurance and to improve industry efficiency and profits.  For example, 
health funds are able to provide broader financial and healthcare products to members 
like life insurance and funding treatments for out of hospital services (e.g., home 
dialysis).  It also passed legislation to sell the Commonwealth-owned health fund, 
Medibank Private.  However, the recently elected Rudd Government stated that it will not 
sell the fund.  It also announced an increase in the income threshold for the Medicare 
Levy Surcharge in the recent Budget, which some commentators and private health 
insurers suggest will create a disincentive for healthy younger people to buy private 
health insurance.  Recent industry initiatives to improve performance include nascent 
fund demutualisation and stock exchange listings, and merger proposals to achieve   3
economies of scale and scope, such as the provision non private health insurance products 
like travel and life insurance.
1    
 
Private health insurance premiums must enable health insurers to cover member claims 
(benefit payments), operating costs (management expenses), an acceptable return on 
capital, and regulatory solvency requirements.  The weight the Minister for Health and 
Ageing places on the individual importance of these components when reviewing health 
fund premium applications is unclear.
2  The Act that governs the industry, the Private 
Health Insurance Act 2007, is silent on this matter.   
 
However, the Minister recently released several criteria that were used to judge whether 
the latest premium proposal for a health fund is contrary to the public interest.  The 
criteria included: size of premium increase sought by the insurer, the average industry 
premium increase, fund market share, membership forecasts, price of competitors’ 
products, other insurers’ premium proposals, the effect of the private health insurance 
rebates on premiums, and the financial circumstances of the insurer (Roxon 2008b).  The 
Minister did not state whether individual criterion have an equal or different weight of 
importance in the assessment of premium proposals.  Nevertheless, it is uncertain 
whether the criteria promote economic efficiency, product innovation and structural 




The prudential industry regulator, the Private Health Insurance Advisory Council 
(PHIAC) and the Department of Health and Ageing review health insurers’ premium 
applications for the forthcoming year before providing advice to the Minister on whether 
to approve the premiums (PHIAC 2007b).
3  It may request additional information from a 
health fund and consult with the Australian Government Actuary. 
 
Little public information is available that describes the information submitted to PHIAC 
or the advice provided to the Minister.  However, the industry regulatory that oversees 
consumer complaints, the Private Health Insurance Ombudsman (PHIO), stated that the 
insurers must provide ‘detailed financial information and cost and benefit projections to 
justify any [premium] increases they seek’ (PHIO 2006, p. 2).  This information must be 
certified by an accredited actuary.  However, there appears little scope for public 
comment on the health insurers’ submissions. 
 
                                                 
1 Economies of scale exist when the average cost of a single service or product declines as output is 
expanded.  Economies of scope arise when it is cheaper to produce two or more goods or services together 
compared to producing them separately. 
2 Insights on the matter may arise when the Minister refuses to approve a premium application that seeks to 
increase premiums, which according to the Private Health Insurance Act 2007 (section 66-10) is contrary 
to the public interest.  The Act requires the Minister to provide Parliament with the reasons for disallowing 
the premium application. 
3 However, there are no formal provisions for this role in the Private Health Insurance Act 2007 (PHIAC 
2007a).   4
Managerial expenses as a proportion of contribution income compared to the industry 
average and compliance with solvency standards are important considerations in 
determining health fund premium increases (PHIAC 2006b, p. 23; Abbot 2007a).
4  
PHIAC publishes certain information on health fund efficiency (e.g., management 
expenses per contribution income) and monitors funds that have unit costs higher than the 
industry average (PHIAC 2005, pp. 92-3).
5 
 
No information is available on the timelines that funds are required to meet to improve 
performance.  Consequently, the current regulatory regime provides reduced incentives 
for health funds to restrict cost increases, compared with regulatory price controls for 
utility and transport services, which are open to public scrutiny (see for example, IPART 
2004).  
 
The existing pricing regime suggests that premiums are largely set according to a cost 
plus regulation regime.  This approach may hinder PHIAC’s ability to balance the 
following objectives when performing its regulatory duties: fostering an efficient and 
competitive health insurance industry; protecting the interests of consumers; and ensuring 
the prudential safety of individual private health insurers.
6 
 
Greater transparency in the premium approval process, which includes the use of rigorous 
performance assessment techniques, would help staunch the growth in premiums.  For 
example, assessments on benefits paid by insurers could involve greater use of cost 
benefit analysis to support the effectiveness of medical treatments and benchmarking 
private hospitals to improve the quality and cost of patient care.
7  Benefit payments 
comprise about 90 per cent of total industry costs (PHIAC 2006b).  A more sophisticated 
approach to benchmark health fund management expenses would further assist in capping 
premium increases.  Management expenses include the costs of providing health 
insurance products such as fund labour costs, rent, marketing, information technology, etc 
and are about 10 per cent of total industry costs.   
 
                                                 
4 PHIAC has completed the first round of fund reviews to gain a better understanding of their operations 
compared to regulatory views formed from analysing financial statements.  It jointly reviews the larger 
funds with the Australia Prudential Regulation Authority.  Among other things, the reviews assessed the 
funds’ monitoring and control systems.  PHIAC considers sound business systems are a necessary 
component to improve industry corporate governance (PHIAC 2007b).  
5 A private health insurer can own more than one fund.  However, the insurers must ensure that the funds 
have separate financial accounts.   
6 Under the previous legislation that regulated the private health insurance industry, the National Health Act 
1953, PHIAC was also required to minimise health insurance premiums. 
7 The Australian Health Insurance Association (AHIA) (2006a) cited research that about 20 per cent of 
surgery in Australian hospitals requires revision or is subject to infection.  It also urged the Commonwealth 
to implement appropriate clinical testing for prostheses because about 20 to 25 per cent of all knee and hip 
replacements fail which require affected patients to undergo additional surgery.  By contrast, Sweden had a 
revision rate of 10 per cent for knee and hip surgery (AHIA 2006b).  The Australian Orthopaedic 
Association (AOA) has established a National Joint Replacement Registry, which, among other things, 
aims to evaluate the effectiveness of different types of prostheses and surgical techniques (AOA 2007). 
Prostheses benefit payments accounted for 14 per cent of total hospital benefit payments, which was about 
$858 million in 2005-06.  Information is not available on benefits paid for specific prostheses (PHIAC 
2006b).    5
This paper focuses on the potential application of incentive regulation, similar to that 
used in setting utility and transport prices, and superior benchmarking techniques to 
establish efficient management expenses for health insurers.  Utility and transport 
regulators often set prices for utility and transport services for several years that reflect 
efficient costs of service delivery.  In Australia, regulators use a building block approach 
to assess efficient capital and operating (non capital) costs.  The price reviews are open to 
public comment and the regulators publish their analysis and reasons in determining 
prices. 
 
Regulators use frontier measurement techniques like data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
and econometric methods, such as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and corrected 
ordinary least squares (COLS), to compliment other regulatory information on utility and 
transport performance to determine the relative efficiency of non capital costs and 
productivity growth trends for the sectors (IPART 1999a; IPART 1999b; Carrington, 
Coelli and Groom 2002; Ofgem 2004; Ofwat 2004; Netherlands Competition Authority 
2006).
8  This performance information is subsequently used to help determine the 
productivity offset in the price cap for the regulated services.  Frontier measurement 
techniques usually assess the relative performance of service providers against sample 
best practice.  By contrast, partial productivity measures (e.g., unit cost) assess utility and 
transport performance against an industry average. 
 
Various government agencies and regulators have used or advocate the use of these 
techniques to assess the performance of government funded services like health, aged 
care, and law and order (SCRCSSP 1997; IPART 1998; Carrington, R., P. Connelly, and 
N. Puthucheary 1997; Carrington et al 1997; Spottiswoode 2000; NSW Treasury 2001; 
Hogan 2004; SCRGSP 2007). 
 
In this paper our principle objective is to conduct a rigorous analysis of efficiency and 
productivity growth in the Australian private health insurance industry.  This analysis 
should provide useful input if the government chooses to introduce incentive regulation 
in the Australian private health insurance industry.  Furthermore, more specific 
contributions include: 
 
•  The provision (to our knowledge) of the first productivity growth estimates for the 
private health insurance industry using frontiers techniques like DEA. 
•  The development of more rigorous input and output measures and price deflators 
to assess industry performance. 
•  An assessment of whether the presence of scale economies support government 
and market initiatives to improve the performance of the industry through 
privatisation and mergers. 
•  An investigation of the influence of service quality on health fund efficiency. 
•  An illustration of how these performance measures can be used in price 
regulation. 
                                                 
8 Regulators also often use partial productivity measures like unit revenue and unit cost, financial ratios and 
financial accounts to assess utility performance.   6
 
The remainder of this paper is divided into sections.  In section 2 the current industry 
structure and regulatory arrangements are described and discussed.  Section 3 provides a 
review of empirical studies of the efficiency of health insurance providers, along with a 
brief discussion of analyses in the closely related areas of general insurance and financial 
services.  Section 4 contains a discussion of the production technology in this industry, 
while Section 5 describes the DEA methods used to estimate this technology.  In section 
6 the sample data and price deflators are described, and the empirical results of the study 
are presented and discussed in section 7.  Finally, some concluding comments and areas 
of future work are provided in Section 8. 
 
2. Private Health Insurance in Australia 
 
Australia has a universal healthcare system with public and private health services 
providers (e.g., hospitals and medical practitioners) and several funding arrangements.  
The Commonwealth health scheme, Medicare, is the main feature of the Australian 
healthcare system.  It is available to all Australians and provides free or subsidised access 
to public hospitals and medical practitioners.  Medicare is funded by general taxation and 
a levy on taxpayer income.  Other Commonwealth funded healthcare schemes include 
subsidised prescribed pharmaceuticals (i.e., the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme) and the 
private health insurance rebate.  Private providers charge people for services.  Fees are 
usually paid by either private health funds or Medicare or by the individuals themselves.  
In many instances all three contribute to the payment of fees for a particular service. 
 
Private health insurance is voluntary but moderate to high-income earners incur an 
additional tax surcharge if they do not have private health insurance
9, and people that join 
a health fund after 30 years of age pay more for cover.
10  Unlike other insurance products, 
health funds cannot discriminate among people and charge premiums according to 
potential health risks.  The funds are required to charge people the same premium for 
similar health cover notwithstanding differences in age (except if people join a fund after 
30 years of age), sex, history of illness, claims history and health.  This arrangement, 
which is known as community rating, aims to increase access to private health insurance.  
Consequently, a fund can, in some cases, have a higher proportion of elderly or 
chronically ill members. 
 
A risk equalisation scheme ensures the cost of hospital care is spread evenly among the 
health funds.  The scheme transfers money from health funds with a higher proportion of 
younger and healthier members to those funds with a higher proportion of elderly and 
chronically ill members, who lodge more claims.  
 
                                                 
9 The Commonwealth announced in the Federal Budget that the income threshold for the Medicare 
surcharge levy will increase from $50,000 to $100,000 for individuals and from $100,000 to $150,000 for 
families.  However, the changes are yet to be approved by the Senate. 
10 The additional premium incurred by these people is cancelled after 10 years of continual membership.   7
Expenditure on health services was $87 billion in 2005-06, which is about 9 per cent of 
GDP (AIHW 2007).
11  The average rate of growth in real total health expenditure was  
5.1 per cent per annum over the 1995-96 to 2005-06 period.  Health expenditure is funded 
two thirds by government and one third by individuals, private health insurance and other 
non government sources (e.g., workers compensation insurers) (AIHW 2007).  Most 
funding from non government sources is funded by individuals.  Private health insurance 
contribution to health funding declined over the last decade from 11 to 7 per cent.  This is 
largely due to the private health insurance rebate (AIHW 2007).   
 
States are responsible for the provision of public health services such as public hospitals, 
mental health programmes, the registration of medical professionals, etc.  Public hospital 
services provided by the States are free of charge and are mainly funded by governments.  
In 2005-06, the States provided 51 per cent of the funding and the Commonwealth 
provided 41 per cent of the funds, with the remainder coming from private health 
insurance insurers, patient out-of-pocket payments, workers compensation and third party 
motor vehicle insurers and other revenue sources (AIHW 2007).  The Commonwealth’s 
share of funding declined over the decade to 2005-06 from 45 to 41 per cent.  By 
contrast, the States share of funding increased from 45 to 51 per cent.  Private hospitals 
are mainly funded by private health insurance. 
 
Private health insurance allows people to decrease the uncertainty, and the associated 
costs, of ill health (risk aversion) by sharing the risk of illness among people (risk 
pooling).  The role of private health insurance is to complement Medicare (Abbot 2007b; 
Medibank Private 2006).  It also offsets costs of services not covered by Medicare (e.g., 
dental, optical and physiotherapy). 
 
The Commonwealth has several motives to encourage people to purchase private health 
insurance.  For example, to relieve pressure on public funded healthcare; to encourage 
product innovation; and to promote greater choice in the delivery of public and private 
healthcare.  There are two broad categories of health insurance: hospital insurance covers 
all or some of the costs of hospital admission, such as accommodation, doctors’ fees and 
operating theatre fees according to the cover bought by consumers,
12  while ancillary 
cover reimburses people some costs for certain health services like dental, optical, 
physiotherapy and natural therapies, and in some States the use of an ambulance.
13 
 
                                                 
11 The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) defines health expenditure as total expenditure 
on ‘hospitals, medical, dental, patient transport services, other health practitioner, community and public 
health services, medications, aids and appliances, health research and administrative systems that support 
these services’ (AIHW 2007, p. xvi). 
12 People can elect to pay lower hospital cover premiums by incurring an up-front excess fee for a hospital 
stay, paying a daily co-payment for hospital accommodation or receiving lower benefits for certain medical 
procedures such as obstetrics related services or joint replacement. 
13 PHIAC (2007a) recently reclassified the ancillary policy as a general treatment policy.  A general 
treatment policy covers the same services covered by the ancillary policy, but it also includes the recent 
services covered by health funds.  These services include hospital substitute treatment and chronic disease 
management programs treatment.   8
In 2005-06, $6.3 billion of private health insurance funding for recurrent health 
expenditure was mainly used to pay private hospitals (49%), dental services (12%), 
administration (10%) and medical services (10%) (AIHW 2007).
14  Private health 
insurance accounted for about 70 per cent of private hospital funding (AIHW 2007) –  
46 per cent funded by premiums and the remainder by the health insurance rebate. 
 
About half of the Australian population aged 15 and over had private health insurance in 
2004-05 (ABS 2006).  The most common reason people gave for having private health 
insurance was it gave them ‘protection, security and peace of mind’ (ABS 2006, p.13).  
Other common reasons for purchasing health insurance was that it: reduced waiting time 
for treatment, provided benefits for ancillary treatments, allowed choice of doctor, and 
permitted treatment in a private hospital.  Of those covered 75 per cent had hospital and 
ancillary cover, 17 per cent had hospital cover only and 7 per cent had ancillary cover 
only.  The level of coverage and type of cover varies among age groups.  61 per cent of 
those aged 45-54 and 55 and 64 had cover while 41 per cent of those aged 15-24 and 75 
and over had cover.  People generally held hospital and ancillary cover across all age 
groups.  However, those aged 75 and over held the highest proportion of hospital only 
cover and younger people 15-24 and 25-34 held the highest proportion of ancillary only 
cover.   
 
The trend in people holding private health insurance declined slightly over recent years.  
The proportion of the total population with health hospital cover declined from 44.9 per 
cent in June 2001 to 43 per cent in June 2006 (PHIAC 2006b).   
 
The most common reason for people not having private health insurance was either they 
were not able to afford health insurance products or that it was too expensive.  Only  
29 per cent of those in the lowest household income quintile had private health insurance.  
By comparison, 76 per cent of people in the highest household income quintile had 
private health insurance (ABS 2006).  Other reasons people gave for not having private 
health insurance included: Medicare provided sufficient cover, people were in good 
health or had no dependents, private health insurance was not good value, and possessing 




In 2005-06, there were 39 health funds in Australia.
15  Most funds are not for profit 
organisations – only five funds were for profit entities.  The majority of health funds are 
open to the public, which include local residents, international students and foreigners 
with working visas.  However, 14 funds restrict membership according to union 
affiliation (e.g., teachers unions) or participation in certain activities (e.g., defence 
forces).   
 
The industry is quite fragmented but highly concentrated.  The six largest insurers 
account for about 76 per cent of the market (as measured by premium income).  Of the 
                                                 
14 Most medical services are provided by registered medical practitioners on a fee-for-service basis.   
15 There are currently 37 health funds.   9
remainder, 25 funds have a combined market share of about 8 per cent (PHIAC 2006b).  
As at 30 June 2006, there were about 4.8 million contributors (policy holders) and about 
10 million people were covered by private health insurance.  The remaining population 
rely on Medicare for health cover.  Summary statistics for the industry and the six largest 
health insurers are presented in table 1. 
 
Medibank Private, which is owned by the Commonwealth, was the only health insurer 
with a national business.
16  It is the largest private health insurer and has about 28 per 
cent of the market.  The other larger funds have significant markets in certain States only.  
For example, MBF, which was recently purchased by BUPA, has significant markets in 
New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania.  By contrast, HBF operates in Western 
Australia only where it is the largest insurer in that State.   
 


























1 375 178  2 812 667  2 901  2 393  10.2  2.4  1.61 
MBF  795 502  1 670 374  1 865  1 488  9.3  2.1  1.52 
BUPA Aus




423 713  964 848  929  759  8.3  0.7  1.93 
HBF  373 524  789 269  749  605  9.2  1.0  1.58 
NIB  302 299  640 178  616  484  9.2  1.7  2.08 
Industry  4 806 754  10 189 552  10 706  8 640  9.4  2.7  1.74 
 
Source: PHIAC (2006b) 
Notes:  
1. Benefit payments excludes State levies on contributors paid to the NSW and ACT governments for 
ambulance cover  
2. MER denotes managerial expense ratio which is defined as managerial expenses as a percentage of 
contribution income.  Management expenses are defined as the operating expenses incurred operating a 
fund such as salaries, commission, rent, etc 
3. Net margin is defined as contribution income less benefits paid to members and management expenses 
expressed as a percentage of contribution income 
4. Solvency multiple measures health fund compliance with the solvency standard for the industry.  It is 
calculated by dividing total assets by the solvency requirement.  See PHIAC 2006(b) for further 
information 
5. † denotes a for profit fund.  NIB became a for profit fund and listed on the Australian Stock Exchange in 
2007.  
 
Member premiums provide the vast majority (96%) of the health funds’ total revenue.  
Investment and other revenue provided the remainder.  The sector struggled to remain 
viable over recent years and was dependent on investment income to produce surpluses.  
Several smaller funds were merged with other insurers after incurring unsustainable 
                                                 
16 BUPA Australia and MBF merged in June 2008 to create a fund with a national business and similar 
market share to Medibank Private.   10
losses.  And the Commonwealth provided an additional $85 million to Medibank Private 
in 2004-05 to bolster its finances.   
 
Industry profits improved in 2005-06.  It reported a surplus of $926 million before tax 
and extraordinary items.  Investment and other revenue contributed $446 million towards 
the surplus.  But the associated net margin for the industry remained a relatively thin  
2.7 per cent.  Still, all funds meet the prudential requirements required by the industry 
regulator (PHIAC 2006b). 
 
Medibank Private was the only large fund to have efficiency less than the industry 
average.  It said the management expense ratio (MER) was higher than previous years 
because an investment programme to upgrade client services and business processes was 
underway.  The fund’s efficiency is better than the industry average if these costs were 




The Private Health Insurance Act 2007 is a complex web of rules and regulations that 
governs the private health insurance industry.  The Act defines: 
 
•  Health insurance 
•  Organisations that can provide health insurance 
•  Insurer obligations 
•  Ministerial powers 
•  The role of industry regulators 
•  Life time health cover  
•  Community rating 
•  Health insurance levies 
•  The tax rebate for private health insurance 
 
The Act also regulates certain business activities and behaviour such as: 
 
•  Health insurance is the major activity of a fund 
•  Product and member definitions 
•  Premium discounts on products  
•  Waiting periods before members receive benefit payments 
•  Prudential standards 
•  Risk equalisation  
•  Ministerial price controls 
•  Takeovers and mergers. 
 
The Act stipulates that regulators publish information to allow consumers to make more 
informed choices in purchasing private health insurance.  For example, the PHIAC 
annual reports provide information on fund financial performance.  PHIO annual reports 
and state of the health fund reports provide key performance indicators for health funds.    11
This information includes service quality measures.  See PHIAC (2007a) for further 
information on the regulatory framework for health funds. 
 
Governments use several approaches to improve the supply, quality of service and 
product innovation in regulated markets.  Two approaches often used are (i) liberalising 
markets and deregulating prices, and (ii) incentive regulation.  The potential application 
of these approaches to the private health insurance industry is discussed below.  
 
Price deregulation  
 
The Industry Commission (1997) challenged whether price control is necessary for health 
insurance products in its inquiry into private health insurance.  It stated that price control 
would not achieve fund solvency, prevent anticompetitive behaviour among funds or 
protect consumers from excessive premium increases for the following reasons.  
Prudential standards are a more direct means to ensure funds are solvent.  Regulating 
premiums would not deter anticompetitive behaviour among funds because the private 
health insurance market had ‘few barriers to new entrants other than low expectations of 
profitability and the impregnability of mutual funds to ‘hostile’ takeovers (IC 1997,  
p. xxxiv)’.
17  Indeed, price controls could deter new entrants, which limits product 
innovation and competitive pressures to minimise costs – ‘thus keeping average 
premiums higher than necessary (IC 1997. p. 327)’.   
 
The Commission noted that health insurance premiums largely reflect benefit payments.  
Consequently, examining proposals such as improved contractual arrangements between 
health funds and hospitals to reduce the cost and increase the quality of patient care is a 
more efficient way to reduce the growth in premium increases.   
 
A recent editorial in the Australian Financial Review also advocated price deregulation 
for private health insurance products.  It said: 
 
… micromanaging health funds is not going to help them consolidate and grow stronger, 
more competitive and better able to deal with the challenges of an ageing population and 
client base, soaring costs of medical technology and doctors’ increasing willingness to 
order costly treatments.  As in other industries, capped prices are a recipe for stifling 
innovation, rewarding mediocrity and penalising success… 
 
If the government allowed market forces to take their course, and consumers to choose, 
the Health Minster and her bureaucrats would not have to waste valuable time trying to 
set premium rates fund by fund and could save on the costly health insurance debate.  
They could then devote more effort to solving bigger challenges – reform state-run 
hospitals, increasing spending on prevention and making someone responsible for getting 
the best health-care outcomes for the taxpayers and the public (AFR 2008a, p. 70). 
 
Governments often introduce price caps to protect consumers from firms that can 
potentially exploit market power to charge excessive prices.  However, market power 
                                                 
17 Fund takeovers are now permissible under the current Act that governs the industry.   12
declines as markets become more contestable.
18  Thus, the need for consumer protection 
declines.  Economic theory suggests that contestable markets with clearly defined 
property rights, low bargaining costs of buying and selling goods and services, and 
deregulated prices provide better price and service quality outcomes for consumers than 
regulating markets that are not subject to market failure - natural monopoly, information 
asymmetries and externalities, for example (Coase 1994; North 1990).  Australian 
consumer legislation and competition policy and law (among other things) prohibits 
anticompetitive behaviour further protects consumers from excessive prices. 
 
Regulators often possess imperfect information to set prices that mirror contestable 
market outcomes.  Furthermore, unlike market prices, regulated prices do not respond 
quickly to sudden changes in the supply and demand for goods and services.  
Consequently, there is considerable risk that regulated prices are set too low which 
restricts investment, product innovation and the supply of goods and services or are set 
too high which reduces consumer welfare.  Yarrow (2008) suggests that a regulated price 
cap that is set above the market clearing price provides a focal point that can potentially 
encourage collusion among firms to reduce the diversity of goods and services offered to 
consumers.  Community welfare is subsequently reduced because consumers have less 
knowledge about these ‘standardised’ goods and services and firms charge higher prices 
than would otherwise prevail in a deregulated market.  Moreover, further reductions in 
consumer welfare are possible because the regulated price cap is approved by a 
regulatory authority which conveys the misleading impression the standard product or 
service is a good deal.  This reduces the incentive for consumers to search for better 
deals.  
 
Over the last two decades, consumers and businesses in Australia and overseas have 
benefited from deregulated prices in diverse activities like infrastructure services, such as 
airport services and power generation, wholesale and retail energy markets for electricity 
and gas, and telecommunications (see for example, Yarrow 2008, Australian Energy 
Markets Commission [AEMC] 2008 and Productivity Commission 2007).  The benefits 
included the additional supply of innovative services, improved reliability of service and 
lower prices.  In Australia, consumers experienced similar benefits in deregulating the 
prices of certain agriculture products (e.g., dairy, wool and wheat) and financial services 
like home mortgages.  This experience suggests that contestable markets deliver 
innovative goods and services demanded by customers at least cost compared to price 
regulation of competitively supplied goods and services.   
 
The recent AEMC
19 review of the effectiveness of competition in the retail electricity and 
gas markets in Victoria
20, which was commissioned by the Ministerial Energy Council,
21 
found effective competition existed among retailers, and that: 
                                                 
18 A contestable market has low barriers to entry and exit.  Thus, it may have one or a few firms but the 
potential threat of new entrants restricts the ability of the incumbents to charge excessive prices or provide 
poor quality of service. 
19 Under the Australian Energy Market Agreement, AEMC is responsible for developing national energy 
markets for electricity and gas and associated market rules.  It is also responsible for evaluating the 
competitiveness of State and Territory retail energy markets to decide whether price regulation be removed,   13
 
The removal of price regulation in Victoria can further extend the benefits of competition 
to consumers by enabling them to choose from a wider range of energy products and 
options (including tariff innovation) than is currently the case.  Where competition is 
facilitating the delivery of efficient outcomes there is no need for retail price regulation.  
Indeed, price regulation in an effectively competitive market is costly in terms of 
administration, compliance and the distortions it imposes on effective functioning of the 
market to the detriment of consumers (AMEC 2008, p. vii).  
 
Established prudential and consumer protection legislation for the retail market that 
address potential market failures such as the inability of consumers to obtain the 
necessary information to compare and assess the value of competing retail products 
further lessens the need for price regulation.  Other regulatory requirements such as the 
obligation of retailers to supply electricity and gas to less profitable customers, official 
price monitoring and a consumer awareness and education campaign of the proposed 
changes to the retail market provide further support for price deregulation (AMEC 2008).  
However, the Victorian Government still retains the option to reintroduce price regulation 
if retail energy prices become excessive or market behaviour impedes competition 
 
The lack of public awareness and information of the influence of the political and 
regulatory complexities (e.g., Commonwealth commitment to community rating) on the 
price of private health insurance products and productivity of health funds potentially 
erects high barriers to the immediate deregulation of premiums.  However, these barriers 
are not insurmountable as Scandinavian countries like Norway successfully deregulated 
electricity retail markets without price controls.   
 
One approach to raise community awareness about the effects of the regulating the price 
of private health insurance on individuals, the funds and the economy is for the 
Commonwealth to publicly release a regulatory impact statement (RIS) on the matter.  
An RIS is required for Commonwealth regulation that has a significant impact on 
businesses, individuals or the economy (Australian Government 2007).  This exercise 
would set out the objectives of the current price controls for private health insurance and 
assess the net benefits of the approach on individuals, the funds and the economy 
(Commonwealth 2007).  Alternative approaches that potentially deliver more efficient 
                                                                                                                                                   
retained or reintroduced.  Victoria was the first jurisdiction to have its retail energy markets reviewed by 
the AMEC. 
20 There are 21 energy retailers in Victoria.  Initially, retail energy products in Victoria and other states 
were provided by government monopolies.  But over time, the competitive behaviour in retail energy 
markets was nurtured through several public policy initiatives like the restructure of the government 
monopolies into separate public and private generation, transmission and retail assets, the development of a 
national energy market and retail price caps.  . 
21 The Ministerial Energy Council was established by the Council of Australian Governments under the 
Australian Energy Market Agreement as the national and governance body for the Australian energy 
market.  The agreement requires, among other things, that the States and Territories remove retail price 
regulation if there is effective competition in their respective retail electricity and gas markets.  Social 
welfare and equity objectives are to be funded through transparent community service obligations that do 
not restrict competitive retail markets.   14
and effective means to achieve the objectives of price regulation such as price 
deregulation are also required to be considered in the RIS.   
 
Otherwise, the Commonwealth could immediately deregulate premium prices and have 
the Australian Consumer and Competition Council (ACCC) officially monitor and report 
to it on premium prices.  Similar arrangements apply to airport charges, medical 
indemnity insurance premiums and petrol prices.  An alternative and less intrusive 
approach is to deregulate private health insurance premiums without ACCC price 
oversight.  Community concerns over premiums could be referred to the ACCC by the 
Commonwealth for a public investigation and report.  The ACCC recently completed a 
similar exercise into grocery retail prices. 
 
To sum up, premium deregulation will encourage health funds to provide a greater 
diversity of health insurance products, including cheaper private health insurance options.  
This outcome provides the Commonwealth with an opportunity to review the merits of 
maintaining current industry assistance, especially subsidising premiums for all policy 
holders.  However, the review must consider the current (or potential changes to) public 
funding for Medicare to assess the net benefits to the community of altering industry 
assistance.  An evaluation of healthcare financing is beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, the National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission is conducting a review 
of the Australian healthcare system, and healthcare finance is included in the review 
(Rudd and Roxon 2008).   
 
That said, a more modest proposal - the introduction of incentive regulation for 
management expenses – would still improve health fund performance and community 
welfare.  Over time, this approach will allow the industry to transition to more effective 
competition in the provision of private health insurance products.  A similar staged 
approach to liberalise retail electricity and gas markets was undertaken by UK energy 
regulators (Yarrow 2008).  The local national energy regulator is recommending a similar 
approach be adopted for the Victorian energy retail market.  
 
Incentive regulation  
 
Incentive regulation is widely used in Australia and oversees to help set prices in utility 
and transport industries such as electricity, gas, water and rail, which traditionally have 
natural monopoly characteristics.  Utility and transport price determinations reflect 
efficient costs and expected productivity gains for the industry .  Thus, incentive 
regulation tries to establish competitive prices for natural monopolies.  
 
In Australia, setting utility and transport prices is a transparent process.  Utilities and 
transport providers submit information on future demand, non capital and capital costs, 
and quality of service to the relevant regulator to help it form a view on efficient costs.  
This information is released for public comment.  Utility and transport regulators also use 
several benchmarking techniques like partial productivity measures, and more 
sophisticated approaches such as DEA and SFA, to develop views on efficient costs and 
previous trends in industry productivity growth (see for example, IPART 1999b and   15
Carrington, Coelli and Groom 2002).  The techniques combine multiple inputs and 
outputs to produce single measures of productivity.  Benchmarking is one approach used 
by regulators to mitigate information asymmetries on utility performance (Carrington, 
Coelli and Groom 2002; Coelli et al 2003).   
 
Regulators are often required to determine the total revenue requirement for a utility or 
transport provider, which must reflect the efficient cost of services provided (see for 
example, IPART 2004).  The cost components (or the building blocks) used to assess 
efficient costs are non capital (operating) costs and capital costs (i.e., depreciation and a 
risk-adjusted return on capital).  Once efficient costs and judgments on future 
productivity growth for the industry are determined the regulator sets the prices for the 
period of the determination, which is usually five years.  Prices are capped according to a 
CPI-X regime, where X is the annual productivity offset that reflects the regulator’s 
views on further productivity gains for the industry and additional incentives for the 
service providers to catch-up with more efficient peers.   
 
European regulators have extended incentive regulation to include service quality targets 
within the utility price caps to encourage improvements in customer service (e.g., Ofgem 
2004; Netherlands Competition Authority 2006).  Utilities that exceed their targets can 
charge customers more for services.  Conversely, utilities that do not meet service quality 
targets are required to charge customers less for services.  Advocates of incentive 
regulation argue that it provides greater incentives for utilities to improve performance 
and reduces regulatory costs compared to cost-of-service regulation (Crew and 
Kleindorfer 1996).  This form of regulation allows utilities to recover the costs of 
providing services to customers, which includes a reasonable rate of return on assets.  
Consequently, cost-of-service regulation encourages utilities to inflate costs to receive 
higher prices for services.  Excessive costs result from over-investing in infrastructure 
assets to increase the return on assets and weaken incentives to improve operating costs.   
 
The use of sophisticated benchmarking techniques improves the information available to 
regulators to set price caps.  If X is set too high then the utility profits may deteriorate.  If 
it is set too low then the utility may earn excessive profits.  Techniques like DEA and 
SFA allow regulators to better assess the trade-offs in management proposals to improve 
utility performance through different input or output mixes or through achieving 
economies of scale or scope compared to partial productivity measures and financial 
ratios.  Judgments about dynamic efficiency, which measures how organisations alter 
production processes over time in response to changes in consumption patterns or 
technology, are also possible.  The techniques can identify factors beyond management 
control, like customer incomes, which may constrain future productivity growth (Coelli, 
et al 2003).  Finally, DEA has an added benefit.  It provides information on efficient 
peers for the less efficient funds, which allows regulators to better frame questions about 
variations in performance. In this study, DEA is used to estimate the productivity growth 
of health funds. 
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3.  Literature Review 
 
The first step in measuring the productivity growth of the health funds is to define their 
production frontier, which is a technical relationship that specifies how physical inputs 
like labour and capital are converted into outputs such as policies sold.   
 
Health fund annual reports suggest that the major objectives of the funds are to sell health 
risk protection products to members, improve insurance products and the quality of 
customer service, act as an intermediary between health providers and fund members to 
help members stay healthy, improve prudential reserves, maximise the return on equity, 
which allows for profit funds to pay dividends to shareholders, and foster corporate 
relationships with the broader community.   
 
The Private Health Insurance Act 2007 essentially determines the outputs of the funds 
because it stipulates the services health funds must provide members.  However, 
measuring the quality of service is a challenging exercise because people have different 
expectations of service quality, given previous experience of customer service, 
expectations and cultural background.  Assessing the performance of health funds 
requires information on both quality of service and productivity.  Otherwise, a health 
fund could improve productivity growth by sacrificing the quality of service.   
 
The main functions of health funds are: 
 
•  Collecting premiums  
•  Processing and payment of claims (benefits) 
•  Providing information to members so that they can make more informed decisions 
to prevent illness, select appropriate cover and to reduce health costs 
•  Investing premiums 
•  Increasing services, product innovation, quality of service, and membership. 
 
The major inputs of health funds are: 
 
•  Labour 
•  Capital (physical) 
•  Other inputs (e.g., materials). 
 
The operating environment and other fund characteristics could influence health fund 
productivity.  The operating environment is, to a large extent, beyond management 
control.  Potential environmental variables and other fund characteristics include:  
 
•  Corporate governance – health funds are either for profit or not for profit 
organisations 
•  Membership restricted or open to the public  
•  National or regional operations  
•  Whether a fund has a higher proportion of sicker or elderly members    17
 
However, data limitations, the unknown extent of cross subsidies between health 
insurance products and other insurance products (e.g., travel and life insurance), and 
difficulties in accurately defining the quality of the outputs and the inputs of health funds 
place restrictions on defining the production frontier used in the study and subsequent 
judgments on performance.  Previous health insurance studies, and studies of similar 
financial organisations, provide insights into how these restrictions might influence 
assessments of performance.  The various approaches used to assess performance in these 
studies are discussed below. 
 
Australian private health insurance studies 
 
To our knowledge there are no productivity growth studies on the local health funds.  
Two studies by the Industry Commission (1997) and CRA International (2006) conduct 
analyses of relative efficiency for the industry.  The studies also examine the presence of 
scale economies for the industry.  The CRA International study is of particular interest 
because the Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee (2006) used it to help 
substantiate the view that Medibank Private be sold.   
 
The Industry Commission studied the performance of the six major funds in 1995-96.  
The smaller funds were excluded from the study because it was assumed they use 
different technologies to provide member services.  The Commission used ordinary least 
squares (OLS) to estimate a linear cost curve for the 27 State/Territory operations of the 
major funds.   
 
Management costs per member were use to measure fund costs.  The independent 
variables included members (both hospital and ancillary), claims per member – a 
composite variable which reflected the different costs in processing ancillary and hospital 
benefit payments per member - and a dummy variable that reflected the age of the fund 
(i.e., whether it was five years or older).  The older funds had higher costs per member 
compared to the newer funds.  The Commission suggested that this could reflect the lack 
of access to technology or weaker incentives to minimise costs. 
 
All the independent variables were significant and the model explained nearly 75 per cent 
of the variation in management costs per member.  Number of members had the expected 
negative influence on costs (implying economies of scale).  The main determinant of cost 
variation was ancillary costs per member, as ancillary claims are more expensive to 
process.  The cost function satisfied several (unreported) standard specification tests – 
including a test for the appropriate use of the simple linear functional form. 
 
The large funds possessed scale economies.  Doubling members reduced management 
costs per member by 20 per cent.  The Commission remarked that the presence of scale 
economies disadvantaged entrants seeking similar market shares of the larger funds 
because the incumbents had lower unit costs.  However, entrants could overcome this 
hurdle by purchasing an established fund.     18
 
The cost function residuals were used to calculate the efficiency of the health funds.  The 
intercept was adjusted to form a cost frontier.  75 per cent of funds lay above the cost 
frontier.  A potential 17 per cent savings ($65 million) in management costs (which was 
about 2 per cent of contribution income) was possible if all major funds were efficient. 
 
The study has several limitations.  First, the omission of input prices as an independent 
variable in an estimated cost function implicitly assumes that all funds face the same 
input prices for labour, capital, rent, etc. in all regions.  However, cost variations are 
likely to include different regional input prices, which potentially hinder assessments on 
fund inefficiency. 
 
Second, efficiency is assessed relative to average sample efficiency rather than best 
practice.  Alternative measurement techniques such as DEA and SFA overcome this 
limitation.  Third, no service quality variables were included in the analysis.  Fourth, the 
analysis confined to one year.  This precludes judgments on dynamic efficiency which 
may influence health fund efficiency in a particular year.  Finally, sensitivity analysis was 
not presented to assess the influence of different output measures or choice of 
measurement technique on the results. 
 
The CRA International (2006) study was commissioned by the Commonwealth 
Department of Finance and Administration to assist the Senate Committee investing the 
merits of selling Medibank Private.  It used DEA to estimate the technical efficiency for 
40 funds in 2004-05.  The study used an input-orientated DEA model.  The main focus of 
the study was to examine to the potential for further productivity gains for Medibank 
Private after it was sold, and the implications that this had for private health insurance 
premiums.  
 
The outputs of the health funds were measured by coverage (i.e. the number of people 
covered by health insurance policies) and real investment returns.  The input measures 
were real benefit payments, real management expenses and real assets (physical and 
financial).  Benefit payments were included to assess fund initiatives to restrict benefit 
payments through demand side management initiatives and better service provider 
arrangements. 
 
The CPI was used to deflate investment income, management expenses and assets, while 
the hospital and medical component of the CPI was used to deflate benefit payments. 
 
The study suggested that funds were, on average, 91 per cent constant returns to scale 
(CRS) efficient and 95 per cent variable returns to scale (VRS) efficient.
22  In other 
words, funds could potentially reduce inputs by an average of 5 per cent.  A further 4 per 
                                                 
22The CRS model is appropriate when funds are assumed to have optimal size (scale).  However, the 
efficiency scores of funds that do no possess optimal size will be influenced by scale inefficiencies.  The 
VRS model recognises that not all funds have optimal size because of government regulations, the 
operating environment, etc.  Thus, the VRS specification allows the calculation of fund efficiency scores 
that exclude the influence of scale inefficiencies.  Section 5 discusses this issue in more detail.   19
cent in input savings was possible if funds achieved optimal scale.  Of the 40 funds, 13 
were found to be CRS efficient and 24 funds were found to be VRS efficient.  The major 
funds were CRS efficient or very close to CRS efficient, which suggests there is little 
scope of efficiency through mergers.  This result is contrary to recent market initiatives 
that seek to merge the major funds into larger funds.  Medibank Private was 99 per cent 
CRS efficient and 100 per cent VRS efficient.   
 
Several environmental variables were used in a second stage regression to assess their 
influence on fund CRS efficiency.  The variables included the number of policies, the 
number of people covered, benefit payments per person covered, funds that receive 
funding from the risk equalisation scheme, funds that are for profit organisations, and 
funds open to the public.  The first three environmental variables were significant.  The 
technical efficiency scores were adjusted to take account of the influence of the 
environmental variables using a second stage regression.
23  After adjusting for 
environmental differences Medibank Private could potentially increase efficiency by 
about 5 to 7 per cent. 
 
CRA International concluded that Medibank Private’s premiums would rise irrespective 
of government or private ownership given the ageing population and the increasing cost 
of medical care.  However, it concluded that private ownership would provide Medibank 
with greater flexibility to achieve further efficiencies through tighter contracting 
arrangements with service providers, increased staff productivity, innovative products, 
and economies of scope.  These initiatives would help offset premium increases. 
 
The study has several limitations, which reduce the robustness of its findings.  First, the 
behavioural assumptions that would justify the use of an input-orientated DEA model are 
not specified.  Second, the production function is not adequately specified.  Investment 
returns are a relatively unimportant output and something largely beyond the control of 
management.  This variable could be excluded from the analysis, which would help 
reduce the dimensions of the DEA model.  The output measure coverage assumes funds 
have similar mix of hospital table members and ancillary only members.  And the unit 
costs of providing services to these member groups are similar. 
 
Real benefit payments are also, to a large extent, beyond the control of management as 
they have little power to influence patient care provided by hospitals.  If funds had 
greater control over benefit payments then they could improve profit margins by reducing 
benefits payments rather than relying on investment returns to help maintain profits.
24,25  
Recent Commonwealth regulation to restrict the growth in prothesis benefit payments, 
                                                 
23 See Coelli et al (2005) for further information on this method. 
24 Medibank Private recently introduced a programme that provides grants to hospitals to help improve 
patient health care outcomes.  In 2006-07, about $2 million was allocated to 38 hospitals to improve patient 
care through the use of ‘evidence-based practice, compliance with clinical guidelines and improved pain 
management’ (Medibank Private 2007, p. 19).  
25 US private health insurers place greater reliance on market processes to achieve greater control in 
reducing the cost of health care services through the use of managed care.  Managed care covers several 
contractual arrangements between the insurers and hospitals and physicians to deliver certain treatments 
and quality of care for specified costs.    20
which were about 13 per cent of hospital treatment benefit payments in 2006-07 (PHIAC 
2007a), provides additional support that funds have little power to reduce benefit 
payments.
26  Furthermore, net margins appear considerably higher for private hospitals 
compared to private health funds (ABS 2007; PHIAC 2005).  Thus, it is difficult to argue 
that benefit payments is an input measure for health funds.  However, given the lack of 
management control over benefit payments, it could be used as an output measure in an 
efficiency study for funds to reflect the work involved in processing members claims.  
Indeed, the Industry Commission used member claims per member as an output measure 
in its health fund efficiency study.   
 
The inclusion of relative benefits payments as input measure in the study provides an 
additional problem because the relatively high efficiency scores produced by the study 
are, to a large extent, the result of the high correlation between coverage and benefits 
paid.  Thus, the inclusion of these two measures in the study could arguably provide a 
misleading impression of fund performance. 
 
Real physical and financial assets are a measure of capital stock instead of the flow of 
capital services, which is the appropriate input measure.  Further, measures of technical 
efficiency should exclude the financial assets.  The use of the CPI to deflate management 
expenses may not accurately reflect input price changes for the industry.   
 
Third, DEA is susceptible to outliers in the data, but efforts to screen the data for outliers 
are not mentioned.  Fourth, the reasons for including certain environmental variables are 
not clear.  For example, management would normally seek to influence variables such as 
policy holders and persons covered.  Furthermore, the number of persons covered is used 
as an output measure in the DEA model.  Including it in the second stage regression will 
bias the coefficient estimates because the residuals are linked to the dependent variable.  
And multicollinearity is likely to be present because the environmental variable is 
essentially regressed against itself.   
 
Fifth, no service quality variables are included in the analysis.  Sixth, the analysis is 
confined to one year.  This precludes judgments on dynamic efficiency
27 which may 
influence health fund efficiency.  Finally, sensitivity analysis on how different input and 
output measures and the choice of technique influence the technical efficiency of health 
funds was not presented. 
 
Studies on other insurance products and financial services 
 
The literature that conducts efficiency analyses of financial organisations like banks and 
insurance companies have generally adopted one of two approaches to specifying 
variables in the production technology: the transactions approach and the intermediation 
                                                 
26 See Doyle (2007) for further information on the regulatory framework that covers the listing of approved 
prostheses products that are eligible for benefit payments, and the setting of the benefit payments for 
prostheses.  
27 Dynamic efficiency refers to the ability of funds to alter technologies or products in response to changes 
in demand or production opportunities over time.   21
approach (Berger and Humphrey 1997).  Under the first approach institutions produce 
services for customers.  For example, institutions complete transactions and process 
documents like paying insurance claims.  Consequently, institutional output measures 
reflect the number and type of these activities.  Only physical inputs to complete these 
activities are included in the transactions approach.  However, information on this type of 
firm activities is often difficult to obtain from secondary sources. 
 
The second approach views financial organisations as intermediaries that allow borrowers 
to use depositors’ savings (e.g., Kirkwood and Nahm 2006; Ray 2007).  Firm transactions 
and document processing are assumed to be proportional to the stock of financial assets 
held by an institution (Berger and Humphrey 1997).
28  Output measures reflect the value 
of financial assets such as reserves, loans and investments.  Under this approach, 
financial assets are included along with the physical inputs because the institutions 
require the funds for their intermediary role.  This information is readily obtained from 
the annual reports of financial institutions.   
 
Controversy surrounds the classification of deposits as an input or an output measure.  
Deposits are part of the financial assets that are used to create the intermediary role for 
institutions.  However, deposits also have output characteristics because they are 
associated with activities like interest payments to customers and safe deposit.  Clearly, 
the approach used to measure performance potentially influences judgments about a 
firm’s relative efficiency and productivity growth.  The transaction approach appears 
better aligned with production theory compared to the intermediary approach.  However, 
the choice of approach is largely dependent on the information available for the analysis. 
 
Insurance studies often use the transactions approach (e.g., Greene and Segal 2004, 
Griffell-Tatjé, and Perelman 2001).  Insurance companies predominately provide risk 
bearing/risk protection services for consumers rather than intermediary services.  Output 
measures that reflect business lines or services provided during the year are used to 
approximate firm activities.   
 
Premiums are often used to measure the risk protection services.  As an output measure, 
premiums have attracted criticism because it is a combination of price and quantity.  
Studies that use panel data deflate premiums by a CPI to overcome this issue (e.g., 
Fuentes, Griffell-Tatjé, and Perelman 2001).  However, the CPI may not adequately 
reflect premium changes. 
 
Instead of premiums, Cummins and Zi (1997) used benefit payments for various life 
insurance products to measure the risk bearing and risk pooling services provided by life 
insurance companies.  However, Greene and Segal (2004) argued that benefit payments 
represent past obligations rather than a measure of current output.  However, as noted in 
the Industry Commission study, benefit payments can measure staff transactions - 
processing member claims, for example. 
                                                 
28 An implicit assumption underpinning this approach is that transactions costs for various loans are similar.  
For example a bank that specialises in car loans has similar transactions costs to a bank that specialise in 
home loans.     22
 
Greene and Segal (2004) used number of new polices sold to approximate the risk 
bearing/risk pooling services provided by life insurance.  Accident and health policies 
provide risk protection services only.  Premiums were used to measure this output as they 
could not estimate the risk associated with each new policy. 
 
Life insurance studies often use a combination of the transactions and intermediary 
approaches.  For example, US life insurance companies’ outputs are life policies, 
annuities, accident and health polices and investment income. The investment of 
premiums and annuity considerations is considered an intermediary service; 
consequently, it is included as an additional output.  Cummins and Zi (1997) measured 
the investment of premiums and annuity considerations by additions to reserves.  
However, additions to reserves are also influenced by when policies mature. Greene and 
Segal used two measures to measure investment income: annuity considerations and the 
value of investments.  The larger the annuities the larger the expected return on investing 
the annuity considerations.  The value of investments measures the effort in investing 
premiums. 
 
Fukuyama and Weber (2001) used the intermediary approach to assess the productivity 
growth of Japanese non-life insurance companies.  The authors use reserves, loans and 
investments as an output measures to represent the financial services provided by these 
companies.  The output measures were deflated by the Japanese CPI.   
 
Input measures vary widely among the insurance studies because estimated production 
technologies differ and there are different data limitations.  Fuentes, Griffell-Tatjé, and 
Perelman used two input measures: labour costs and other outlays.  Labours costs include 
wages and commissions paid to intermediaries.  Other outlays include capital 
consumption and purchases of supplies and equipment.  The inputs were deflated by the 
Spanish CPI. 
 
Cummins and Zi used three inputs: labour, financial capital and materials.  The price of 
labour is measured by a premium weighted wages indexed.  The average US weekly 
wages for each state is weighted by the proportion of premiums collected in each state.  
The price of capital is measured as a three year moving average of net income to equity.  
The price of materials is calculated by a Divisia index of the deflators of the major 
components of non labour inputs purchased by insurers.   
 
The deflators used in this study have several limitations.  First, premiums may not 
provide the appropriate weights to combine state wages as it has a price and a quantity 
component.  Therefore, states of similar size could receive markedly different weights 
because insurance prices are higher in one state compared to the other.  Second, wages 
could reflect differences in price and the compositions of labour rather than the price of 
labour.  Even if wage rates were similar across states the price of labour could differ. 
 
Third, the price of capital includes both debt and equity.  An insurance company may 
have a higher return on equity because it has borrowed more than another company.    23
Furthermore, the current capital price deflator reflects the stock of capital and not the 
flow of capital services.  The price of physical capital is not included in the study.   
 
Greene and Segal used three inputs: labour, capital and materials.  The price of labour is 
calculated as the total cost of employees and agents employed by the companies divided 
by total employees and agents.  Capital consists of financial and physical capital.  
Financial capital is defined as the book value of equity plus the asset valuation reserve.  
Physical capital is the sum of capital expenses: rent, rental of equipment and depreciation.  
The price of capital is defined as the opportunity cost of holding financial capital and is 
measured as the ratio of 5 years’ return on equity to return on investments over the same 
period.  The limitations of this price deflator are discussed above.  Materials are 
measured as operating expenses less labour and capital costs.  The use of materials is 
principally related to the number of policies sold or terminated during the year.  Thus, the 
price of materials is defined as the related expenses of selling and terminating policies 
during the year divided by the total number of policies sold or terminated.  The approach 
used to define the price of materials could produce negative values for materials as it is 
often difficult to measure capital accurately.  
 
Fukuyama and Weber (2001) use two inputs, which are labour and capital.  Labour is 
measured by the number of full-time equivalent office workers and internal personnel.  
However, this measure does not account for differences in the composition and quality of 
staff.  Furthermore, insurance companies that use contractors will appear relatively more 
productive compared to those that do not use contractors.   
 
Capital is measured by the asset value of movable and immovable equipment and 
buildings and is deflated by the CPI.  This measure has several limitations.  First, the 
stock of assets does not measure the flow of capital services which is the correct input to 
be measured.  Second, asset values can vary according to accounting methods used by the 
insurance companies to value assets, and the age of the assets.  Older assets will have less 
value under historic accounting compared to, say, the replacement cost valuation method.  
Finally, deflating capital values by the CPI may not accurately reflect changes in the price 
of capital. 
 
Several studies examined the influence of organisational form on firm efficiency.  
Cummins and Zi use parametric and non parametric tests to assess the influence of 
mutual and stock forms on the efficiency of US life insurance companies.  By contrast, 
Greene and Segal included a dummy variable for similar organisational forms directly in 
the estimated stochastic cost function for US life insurance companies.  The dummy 




The literature review suggests that there are several challenges to obtaining robust 
estimates of health fund performance.  Few studies specify the ideal production function 
for insurance and other financial services.  Consequently, it is difficult to judge the 
degree of bias in the efficiency or productivity growth results given the data limitations   24
faced by researchers, especially those that use the intermediary approach to measure 
performance.  Specifying the theoretical production would assist whether input and 
output measures used in the analysis are correct – for example, is benefit payments an 
output or an input of health funds?  And it would help clarify the limitations of the 
assumptions that underpin the intermediary approach, which are often not acknowledged.  
The influence of quality of outputs and inputs on performance was rarely considered in 
the studies. 
 
Input and output measures vary in quality, especially capital measures.  Developing 
appropriate input and output price deflators requires detailed knowledge of company 
operations and finances, which is often not available.  Consequently, alternative deflators 
like the CPI are used which may inadequately reflect actual price changes.  Finally, 
analysis of the sensitivity of performance to model specification, input or output 
measures or choice of benchmarking technique was rarely considered. 
 
4.  A Model of a Health Insurance Provider 
 
The transactions approach is selected to assess the productivity growth of health funds 
because it is aligned with production theory, which provides the best description of how 
health funds convert inputs into outputs to achieve corporate objectives.  Moreover, there 
is less controversy over specifying the input and output measures for health funds 
compared to the intermediary approach.  The approach is consistent with previous 
Australian health insurance studies and several studies that assess the performance of 
broader financial services, especially the insurance industry.   
 
The productivity growth model used in this study examines the potential for funds to 
increase outputs such as expanding market share through attracting new membership or 
selling additional insurance to existing members, or improving quality of service given 
existing management expenses, which include capital costs.  Health fund annual reports 
suggest that insurers seek to maximise outputs but are conscious of reducing costs.  We 
judge that maximising outputs is the dominant objective for the health funds, especially 
the larger funds.  This observation is consistent with recent market proposals to merge 
health funds.   
 
Our approach to measure productivity growth seeks to improve on the use of unit 
management expenses by PHIAC to assess the efficiency of health funds to meet industry 
average unit costs rather than best practice unit costs.  Hence the incentives for health 
funds to minimise costs is arguably weakened.  Unlike the CRA International study, total 
costs (i.e., benefit payments, management expenses and capital costs) are not used in the 
study for several reasons .  First, PHIAC does not focus on total costs when assessing 
fund efficiency.  Second, as discussed above, it is not clear whether funds can control 
benefit payments. 
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Proposed models 
 
Table 2 presents the models developed for the study to assess individual fund and 
industry productivity growth and relative efficiency.  Model 1 is the preferred model.  
Membership is separated according to members covered by different types of hospital 
policies which includes hospital only cover and hospital and ancillary coverage, and those 
covered by ancillary only private health insurance.  The complexity and time to process 
claims for these types of members is assumed to differ.  The findings of the Industry 
Commission study support this view.  Regulators used a similar approach to recognise 
differences in resources used to deliver energy services to different customer groups 
(IPART 1999b). 
 
Table 2: Health fund DEA models 
 
Measure  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Outputs        
Membership coverage    √  √ 
Membership coverage – 
hospital only and 
hospital and ancillary 
√   √  
Membership coverage – 
ancillary only 
√   √  
Real total revenue  √  √   
Inputs        
Real management 
expense 
√  √  √  √ 
 
The preferred model allows for differences in the scope and quality of health insurance 
products offered by health funds.  It also allows for differences in the mix of hospital 
insurance products and ancillary only insurance products.   
 
Output measures reflect the services provided to members, which as mentioned above, is 
a proxy for firm activity.  Output measures are members or types of member serviced and 
total revenue.  Total revenue includes premiums and returns on investments.  The ABS 
uses premiums to derive measures of private health insurance output in the National 
Accounts (ABS 2000).
29  Most insurance studies use premiums to measure demand for 
services. 
 
                                                 
29 The ABS develops gross operating surplus (GOS) measures for non life insurance companies (which 
include health funds) in the following manner.  Premiums are considered to have two components: a 
service charge and a payment to cover the risk on providing insurance.  The service charge comprises 
premiums earned plus income earned on technical reserves less expected claims.  Technical reserves are 
defined as unearned premiums (premiums are paid in advance) less claims incurred but not yet paid.  Thus 
the GOS for non life insurance companies is calculated as the ‘insurance service charge plus explicit 
service charges plus gross rental income from dwellings or commercial buildings plus non insurance 
business income plus subsidies less operating expenses (excluding the consumption of fixed capita) less 
consumption of imputed financial services plus the capitalised software adjustment’ (ABS 2000, p. 305).   26
Cummins and Zi (1997) used benefit payments as output measure to proxy fund 
transactions undertaken to satisfy demand for services.  Benefit payments and premiums 
are highly correlated because funds typically set premiums according to expected claims.  
Thus, excluding benefit payments in output will not significantly influence the results of 
the study.  Including both premiums and benefits paid as outputs would introduce 
estimation bias in the analysis.   
 
Investment income is a relatively small proportion of total revenue.  Thus, it is a 
relatively unimportant output for health funds.  Most health fund investments are held as 
cash or interest bearing assets (PHIAC 2006b), which limits the time and effort managing 
these investments compared to property or equity holdings.  Moreover, investment 
returns are often volatile and beyond the control of management.  Consequently, 
investment revenue is combined with premiums, to create a total revenue variable.  Total 
revenue is subsequently deflated by an index of premium increases, to create a real total 
revenue variable.  The premium deflator is discussed further in the section 6. 
 
Financial information is only available for inputs.  A single input measure managerial 
expense, which includes physical capital costs, is used to measure health fund inputs.
30  
Managerial expenses are deflated by an index that measures input price increases.  The 
deflator is discussed further in section 6. 
 
The preferred model does not provide any incentives for health funds to improve 
commercial arrangements with health care providers to increase quality of care or reduce 
treatment costs or both.  Accordingly, the model implicitly assumes a cost pass through 
mechanism similar to that used regulators to allow utilities to share foreseen but uncertain 
additional or decreased costs with consumers that occur during the regulatory period – 
changes in government taxation or regulatory policies such as compulsory changes in 
service standards, for example (IPART 2004).  The additional costs or savings are not 
included in a utility’s cost building block but are accounted for the in a pass through 
mechanism.  Consumer prices are increased or decreased according to the incremental 
costs or savings.   
 
The inclusion of benefit payments as an input could potentially introduce incentives for 
health funds to improve performance.  However, as noted earlier, this approach has 
several limitations.  First, health funds do not appear to have control over benefits paid.  
Consequently, the Commonwealth appears to allow the funds to pass on most hospital 
and medical practitioner costs through capped premium increases.  Second, benefit 
payments is highly correlated to the output measures used in the study.  Hence, the 
inclusion of this variable as an input in the preferred model would produce artificially 
high relative efficiencies for the health funds, which would distort judgments on 
individual fund and industry performance. 
 
On average, ancillary-only members contribute about 10 per cent of total revenue.  
Therefore, Model 2 is used to assess the scope for further simplification of the production 
                                                 
30 PHIAC includes depreciation but excludes a return on capital in management expenses.  This is discussed 
further in section 6.   27
process for health funds.  The model assumes that heterogeneity of insurance product 
offerings and members is not important in assessing performance. 
 
Models 3 and 4 rank the funds’ unit costs to assess performance.  This approach is similar 
to that used by PHIAC to assess fund and industry performance.  The study uses coverage 
per management expense whereas PHIAC uses member contribution income per 
management expense.  The use of frontier techniques to estimate unit cost models permit 
assessments of fund and industry efficiency relative to observed best practice and scale 




In this paper we use data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to fit production frontiers 
over the sample data and then measure efficiency as the distance that each health 
insurance provider (HIP) lies below this frontier.  We also use these DEA methods to 
calculate total factor productivity (TFP) growth over time for each HIP using the 
Malmquist index methods described in Fare et al (1994) and Coelli, et al (2005).  A brief 
description of the methods we use is now provided. 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
DEA is a linear-programming methodology, which uses data on the input and output 
quantities of a group of HIPs to construct a piece-wise linear surface over the data points.  
This frontier surface is constructed by the solution of a sequence of linear programming 
problems – one for each HIP in the sample.  The degree of technical inefficiency of each 
HIP (the distance between the observed data point and the frontier) is produced as a by-
product of the frontier construction method. 
DEA can be either input-orientated or output-orientated.  In the input-orientated case, the 
DEA method defines the frontier by seeking the maximum possible proportional 
reduction in input usage, with output levels held constant, for each HIP. Alternatively, in 
the output-orientated case, the DEA method seeks the maximum proportional increase in 
output production, with input levels held fixed.  The two measures provide identical 
technical efficiency scores when a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology applies, but 
can provide different scores when variable returns to scale (VRS) is assumed.  In this 
paper an output orientation has been selected because it would be fair to assume that 
these HIPs (in the short run) aim to maximise membership, given the resources they have 
available. 
Given data for N HIPs, the linear programming (LP) problem that is solved for the i-th 
HIP in an output-orientated DEA model is as follows: 
 
 maxφ,λ φ, 
 st  -φyi + Yλ ≥ 0, 
  xi - Xλ ≥ 0,   28
  λ ≥ 0,      (1) 
where yi is a M×1 vector of output quantities for the i-th HIP; xi is a K×1 vector of input 
quantities for the i-th HIP; Y is a N×M matrix of output quantities for all N HIPs; X is a 
N×K matrix of input quantities for all N HIPs; λ is a N×1 vector of weights; and φ is a 
scalar. 
Observe that φ will take a value greater than or equal to one, and that φ-1 is the proportional 
increase in outputs that could be achieved by the i-th HIP, with input quantities held 
constant. Note also that 1/φ defines a technical efficiency (TE) score which varies 
between zero and one (and that this is the output-orientated TE score reported in our 
results). 
The above LP is solved N times – once for each HIP in the sample.  Each LP produces a 
φ and a λ vector.  The φ-parameter provides information on the technical efficiency score 
for the i-th country and the λ-vector provides information on the peers of the (inefficient) 
i-th HIP.  The peers of the i-th HIP are those efficient HIPs that define the facet of the 
frontier against which the (inefficient) i-th HIP is projected.  
The DEA problem can be illustrated using a simple example.  Consider the case where 
there are a group of five HIPs producing two outputs (e.g., full insurance and ancillary-
only insurance customers).  Assume for simplicity that each HIP has identical input 
vectors.  These five HIPs are depicted in Figure 1.  HIPs A, B and C are efficient HIPs 
because they define the frontier, while D and E are inefficient HIPs.  For HIP D the 
technical efficiency score is equal to 
 TED = 0D/0D′,     (2) 
and its peers are HIPs A and B.  In the DEA output listing this HIP would have a 
technical efficiency score of approximately 0.6 (or 60 percent) and would have non-zero 
λ-weights associated with HIPs A and B.
31   
The LP in (1) is an example of a CRS DEA model.  We also estimate a VRS DEA model 
by adding the constraint that the lambda weights must add to one.  This VRS DEA model 
envelopes the data more tightly than the CRS DEA model and hence it produces TE 
scores that are less than or equal to the CRS DEA scores.  The difference between the 
two sets of scores is interpreted as being due to scale inefficiency.  For example, if 
TECRS=0.6 and TEVRS=0.8, then scale efficiency (SE) will be:  
  SE = TECRS/TEVRS = 0.6/0.8 = 0.75,   (3) 
                                                 
31 Note that the DEA output listing for HIPs A, B and C would provide technical efficiency scores equal to 
one and each country would be its own peer.   29
which implies that productivity is 25 percent below potential because the HIP is not 
operating at optimal scale. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Output-Orientated DEA 
 
 
The Malmquist TFP Index 
The Malmquist TFP index measures the TFP change between two data points (e.g., those 
of a particular HIP in two adjacent time periods) by calculating the ratio of the distances 
of each data point relative to a common technology.  Following Färe et al (1994), the 
Malmquist TFP change index between period s (the base period) and period t is given by 
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× = , (4) 
where the notation do
s(xt, yt) represents the distance from the period t observation to the 
period s technology.
32  A value of mo greater than one will indicate positive TFP growth 
from period s to period t while a value less than one indicates a TFP decline.  Note that 
equation (4) is, in fact, the geometric mean of two TFP indices.  The first is evaluated 
with respect to period s technology and the second with respect to period t technology. 
An equivalent way of writing this productivity index is  
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× = , (5) 
where the ratio outside the square brackets measures the change in the output-oriented 
measure of Farrell technical efficiency between periods s and t.  That is, the efficiency 
change is equivalent to the ratio of the technical efficiency in period t to the technical 
efficiency in period s.  The remaining part of the index in (5) is a measure of technical 
change.  It is the geometric mean of the shift in technology between the two periods, 
evaluated at xt and also at xs.   
Following Färe et al (1994), the required distance measures for the Malmquist TFP index 
are calculated using DEA-like linear programs.  For the i-th HIP, four distance functions 
are calculated in order to measure the TFP change between two periods, s and t.  This 
requires the solving of four linear programming (LP) problems.  The required LPs are: 
 [do
t(yt, xt)]
-1 = maxφ,λ φ, 
 st  -φyit + Ytλ ≥ 0, 
  xit - Xtλ ≥ 0, 




-1 = maxφ,λ φ, 
 st  -φyis + Ysλ ≥ 0, 
  xis - Xsλ ≥ 0, 




-1 = maxφ,λ φ, 
 st  -φyis + Ytλ ≥ 0, 
  xis - Xtλ ≥ 0, 




-1 = maxφ,λ φ, 
 st  -φyit + Ysλ ≥ 0, 
  xit - Xsλ ≥ 0, 
  λ ≥ 0.      (9) 
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6. Data 
 
PHIAC and PHIO regulatory statistics are used to measure health fund performance.  
Productivity growth estimates are produced for the period 2000-01 to 2004-05.
33  More 
recent data is excluded because we are uncertain how recent changes to the financial 
reporting framework for health funds influence costs and revenues compared to the data 
used in the study.
34   
 
Information on number of members, premiums, investment revenue and management 
expenses is used to create output and input measures.  Consistent information on advice 
funds provide to members on health and policy matters was not available for individual 
health funds.  Hence, this output was excluded from the analysis.
35 
 
PHIAC does not publish the components of individual health fund expenses.  However, it 
published management expenses for 2002-03 by category for the industry (PHIAC 2003).  
The proportion of individual cost components to management expenses for the industry 
for 2002-03 was assumed to be similar over funds and the remainder of sample period.  
Some capital costs were not included in management expenses.  Depreciation was 
included but a return on capital was excluded.  Depreciation is assumed to be still 
included in the health funds’ expenses in the latter years of the sample period.  A return 
on physical capital is added to expenses for the whole sample period.  The average 10-
year government bond rate for the relevant year was used to calculate the annual nominal 
rate on return on property, plant and equipment.  Capital costs are about 5 per cent of 
management expenses. 
 
There were 40 health funds in 2004-05.  Both small and large funds are included in the 
analysis because they essentially use the same labour, materials and technologies to 
provide similar services to members.  There are some differences in capital used as the 
large funds possess office branch networks to provide services to members.  However, 
capital costs for the large funds are less than 5 per cent of total management expenses.  
Some large funds may lease branch properties and incur additional rent compared to 
small funds.  However, labour is the major expense incurred by funds.  The industry 
average for labour costs is 65 per cent of management expenses.  Most funds use 
technology advances such as websites to provide information to members and limited 
claims processing.   
 
DEA results can be sensitive to outliers in the data.  Descriptive statistics, ratio analysis 
and regression analysis were used to screen the data for outliers.  The sample was 
                                                 
33 The statistics are obtained from the regulators’ websites – www.phiac.gov.au and www.phio.org.au. 
34 Health funds use the recently introduced Australian Equivalents to the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (AEIFRS) to report financial information.  Under the new accounting framework there are 
different treatments in recognising certain revenues, asset valuations and liability valuations for health 
funds compared to the previous financial reporting framework (PHIAC 2006b). 
35 If providing advice to members was a constant proportion to the number of members then exclusion of 
this output would have little influence on the analysis.   32
reduced to 39 after the Reserve Bank of Australia’s health fund, which is the smallest 
fund, was excluded because it had costs per member which were very low compared to 
other smaller funds.  This suggests that certain management expenses are included in 




Output and input price indexes were developed to deflate premiums and total expenses.  
The base year for the indexes is 2004-05.  Premium increases were well above the CPI 
over the sample period.  Therefore, deflating premiums by the CPI overstates real 
premium increases, which results in upward biased productivity growth measures if this 
is deflator is used.   
 
Ideally, information on premium increases for individual fund health insurance products 
and associated revenue shares is required to construct the premium deflator.  But this 
information is not publicly available.  PHIAC (2007) published information for average 
premium increases for individual funds for 2002 to 2007, which could be weighted by 
fund members to create a premium deflator.  However, information on fund premium 
increases for the earlier years of our data set is not available.   
 
Consequently, an output price index is developed using the annual industry average 
premium increase to deflate premiums.  However, the deflator overstates real premiums 
for funds that have premium increases greater than the average.  For most funds premium 
increases occur in April each year.
36  Consequently, the average premium increase for a 
particular financial year is weighted by the months that the premium increase occurred in 
the financial year to produce the output price index.   
 
Investment revenue was combined with premiums to create a total revenue variable, 
which was deflated by the premiums deflator discussed above.  An alternative Tornqvist 
output deflator for total revenue was constructed which used the revenue shares of 
premiums and investment revenue as the index weights.  The price series for investment 
revenue was approximated by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) weighted 
average eight capital cities - all groups CPI (ABS Cat. no. 6401.0).  There was little 
difference in the two deflators as premiums are the major source of revenues for health 
funds. 
 
A Tornqvist input price index was developed to deflate management expenses.  The 
index had three expense categories: labour, capital costs and other costs.  The weights for 
each category were based on the PHIAC management expense categories for 2002-03.  
The share weights are: labour 65 per cent, capital costs 5 per cent and other costs 30 per 
cent.  ABS prices series are used to proxy input price changes for the expense categories.  
The prices series included the labour price index – finance and insurance (ABS Cat. no. 
6345.0) for labour costs, private gross capital formation (ABS Cat. no. 5206) for capital 
costs and the CPI for other costs.  See Coelli et al (2005) for further information on 
Tornqvist indexes. 
                                                 




Service quality is measured by several measures of customer satisfaction, which are 
published by the PHIO (2005).  The measures include the percentage of membership 
retention for two years or more, annual percentage growth in membership and the 
percentage of ancillary claims processed within five days.   
 
Dummy variables are created for several fund characteristics.  These include whether a 
fund: is a profit or non profit organisation; is an open or restricted fund; receives monies 
from the risk equalisation scheme; and has offices in more than one State.  For profit 
funds are expected to have increased fund efficiency compared to not for profit funds as 
they have greater incentives to minimise costs or expand membership.  Open funds are 
expected to have increased efficiency as they have a greater ability to expand 
membership through organic growth and mergers compared restricted funds. 
 
Funds that receive monies from the risk equalisation fund tend to have a higher 
proportion of chronically ill or elderly members, which lodge relatively higher claims.  
The funds are required to spend greater resources servicing these members which leave 
less time and resources to implement strategies to minimise costs or expand membership.  
Thus, a higher proportion of chronically sick or elderly members within a fund are 
expected to decrease fund efficiency.   
 
Funds that have offices in more than one State incur additional costs to provide services 
to members.  However, the funds have more opportunities to achieve economies of scale,  
and diversify the regional risk of servicing members in particular States.  Thus, the 
expected influence that this variable has on efficiency is unclear. 
 




The technical efficiency results for Model 1 (the preferred model) for 2004-05 are 
presented in table 3.  The efficiency scores indicate the potential for health funds to 
increase outputs given existing inputs.  An efficiency score of ‘1’ indicates that the health 
fund is technically efficient.  Efficiency measures were calculated for 2000-01 to 2004-05 
as part of the process of estimating productivity growth for the industry.  The pattern of 
technical efficiency change over time is presented below in the discussion of the 
productivity growth results for the health funds. 
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Table 3: Summary results: Efficiency of health funds, 2004-05 
 






Nature of scale 
inefficiency 
ACA Health Benefits Fund
*  0.896 1.000 0.896  irs 
Aus. Health Management Groupˆ  0.468  0.598  0.783  drs 
AMA Health Fund
*  0.519 0.552 0.941  irs 
Aus. Unity Health
†  0.531 0.671 0.792  drs 
BUPA Aust.
†  0.742 1.000 0.742  drs 
CBHS Friendly Society
*  1.000 1.000 1.000  - 
Cessnock District Health Benefits Fund  0.506  0.674  0.751  irs 
Credicare Health Fundˆ  0.616  0.621  0.992  irs 
Defence Health
*ˆ  1.000 1.000 1.000  - 
Druids  NSWˆ  0.324 0.361 0.896  irs 
Druids  Vic  0.391 0.434 0.902  irs 
Federation  Health  0.275 0.275 0.999  - 
GMHBA  0.836 0.902 0.927  drs 
Grand United
†ˆ    0.376 0.376 1.000  - 
Grand United Corporate Health
†ˆ  0.398 0.399 0.998  irs 
HBF    0.907 1.000 0.907  drs 
Hospitals Contribution Fund  0.703  1.000  0.703  drs 
Health Care Insurance
*ˆ  0.610 0.653 0.934  irs 
Healthguard    0.558 0.559 0.999  irs 
Health  Partners  0.746 0.786 0.949  drs 
Health Insurance Fund of WAˆ  0.558  0.562  0.992  irs 
Latrobe  Health  Servicesˆ  0.446 0.447 0.997  irs 
Lysaght Peoplecare
*  0.830 0.845 0.982  irs 
MBF  0.617 0.914 0.675  drs 
MBF Health
†  0.981 1.000 0.981  drs 
Medibank  Privateˆ  0.663 1.000 0.663  drs 
Mildura District Hospital Fund  1.000 1.000 1.000  - 
Manchester  Unityˆ  0.376 0.483 0.780  drs 
Navy Health
*  0.539 0.544 0.989  irs 
NIBˆ  0.499 0.758 0.657  drs 
Phoenix Health Fund
*ˆ  0.790 0.848 0.931  irs 
SA Police Employees Health Fund
*  0.718 0.745 0.964  irs 
Qld  Country  Healthˆ  0.734 0.773 0.950  irs 
Qld Teachers’ Union Health Fund
*ˆ  0.484 0.485 0.998  drs 
Railway & Transport Health Fund
*  0.481 0.485 0.991  irs 
St  Luke’sˆ  0.485 0.487 0.996  irs 
Teachers Federation Health
*ˆ  0.974 1.000 0.974  drs 
Transport Health
*  0.862 1.000 0.862  irs 
Western District Health Fund  0.647  0.700  0.924  drs 
Mean  efficiency  0.643 0.716 0.908   
Standard  deviation  0.209 0.231 0.109   
Minimum  0.275 0.275 0.657   
Maximum  1.000 1.000 1.000   
Efficient  funds  3 11 5   
Notes: irs = ‘increasing returns to scale and drs = ‘decreasing returns to scale’.   
† denotes a for profit fund.  
* denotes a restricted member fund.   
^ denotes funds that had average premium increases greater than the industry average of 7.58%, which 
commenced in April or May 2004. 
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The CRS technical efficiency scores suggest, on average, that the funds are producing 
outputs that are 36 per cent below efficient levels, given existing inputs.  There is a large 
diversity in performance.  Three funds are technically efficient while the least efficient 
fund, Federation Health, is producing 72 per cent below its potential.  There are no 
uniform features that categorise technically efficient funds.  Two funds were restricted 
member funds.  None of the larger funds were technically efficient. 
 
Dropping the assumption that health funds are of optimal size allows for better 
comparisons.  The resultant DEA model which, is known as the VRS model, is such that 
the health funds are benchmarked against funds of similar size.  In this study, greater 
emphasis is placed on the VRS efficiency scores, because in our assessment (over the 
sample period) the size of a health fund was, to a large extent, beyond management 
control.  However, PHIAC did merge a few funds in financial difficulties with funds 
which are financially sound.  Market initiatives such as takeovers and mergers are now 
permissible under the new private health insurance legislation. 
 
The VRS efficiency measure suggests that, on average, the funds are producing output 
levels that are 28 per cent below potential levels, given existing inputs.  VRS efficiency 
ranges from 28 per cent to 100 per cent.  Eleven funds are VRS efficient.  The larger 
health funds’ VRS efficiency is higher than the sample average because most are VRS 
efficient.  NIB was the least VRS efficient of the larger funds.  But its efficiency was still 
above the sample average.  Medibank Private is VRS efficient which suggests there is 
little scope to improve operating performance by selling the fund. 
 
Most for profit funds had VRS efficiency less than the sample average.  This suggests 
that private ownership does not guarantee superior fund performance.  Two of the poorer 
performing funds were transferred to other funds during 2005 and PHIAC cancelled their 
registration towards the end of the year.  Grand United was transferred to Australian 
Unity and the least efficient fund, Federation Health, was transferred to Latrobe Health 
Services. 
 
The results suggest that there is little incentive for funds to improve performance under 
the current regulatory regime.  Eleven of the 18 funds that received above industry 
average premium increases in 2004-05 had VRS efficiency less than the sample average.  
Of the remainder, three funds were VRS efficient (PHIAC 2007).  Under incentive 
regulation, the less efficient funds would receive smaller premium increases compared to 
relatively efficient funds to encourage improved performance.   
 
After the funds achieve VRS efficiency there is, on average, another 9 per cent gain in 
scale efficiencies.  The larger funds tend to be too large whereas the remaining funds tend 
to be too small.   
 
Scale is a major source of efficiency gains for the larger funds.  However, care is required 
in interpreting this result. These funds dominate the industry; consequently, they lie 
towards the fringe of the CRS frontier with few peers.  Thus, scale inefficiency may be 
overstated.  The larger funds are seeking to improve scale efficiency through mergers and   36
takeovers to establish funds to rival the size of Medibank Private.  And Medibank Private 
is seeking to buy a smaller fund, the Australian Health Management Group, to maintain 
its position as largest health fund (AFR 2008b).  
 
There is less potential for smaller funds to improve scale efficiencies through mergers.  
However, the funds could explore opportunities to introduce or expand shared services to 
mimic improvements in scale efficiencies.  For example, combining back office functions 
like payroll, information technology and human resources.
37 
 
Table 4 summarises the information presented in table 3 according to fund size.  The 
results clearly indicate that scale efficiency is the main issue for the large funds and VRS 
efficiency is the major issue for the smaller funds.  The Wilcoxon sum rank test suggests 
there is no significant difference in the mean CRS efficiency scores for the large and 
small funds at the five per cent level of significance.
38  However, the test suggests that 
there are significant differences in the funds’ mean VRS efficiency and scale efficiency.   
 
Table 4: Summary results: Mean and median efficiency of large and smaller funds,  
2004-05 
 








Mean coverage (no.) 
1,274,346.0 
Mean real total revenue  
$993,538,800  









Median efficiency  0.683  1.000  0.689 
Smaller funds 
(n=33) 
Mean coverage (no.) 
64,794 
Mean real total revenue  
$53,525,290 









Median efficiency  0.558  0.653  0.974 
 
To sum up, there is considerable scope for health funds to improve efficiency.  The 
potential large gains in efficiency underscore the urgency to revamp the regulatory 
                                                 
37 One of the objectives of the Health Insurance Restricted Membership Association of Australia is to 
encourage the use of shared services among its members.  Several regional funds that are open to the public 
are members of the association.  
38 The Wilcoxon sum rank test (also known as the Mann-Whitney test) determines whether two samples 
have the same probability distribution by examining the location of their medians.  Thus, it is a non-
parametric way of comparing the arithmetic means of two samples.     37
process to approve premiums.  The introduction of incentive regulation for management 
expenses is the first step in overhauling the regulatory process.  The PHIAC approach to 
improve fund efficiency through focusing only on fund MERs significantly higher than 
the industry average provides a less challenging benchmark for funds to improve 
performance compared to sample best practice.  PHIAC does not define what 
significantly higher MER than the industry average is.  Assuming that fund MERs greater 
than 20 per cent of the industry average is significantly higher than the industry average 
then only nine funds would be targeted by PHIAC to improve performance.
39  
 
MER ratio analysis limits judgments on scale efficiency because it implicitly assumes 
that the funds have optimal scale.  By contrast, the efficiency results reveal the extent of 
scale inefficiency and can be used to benchmark fund efficiency to encourage mergers 
among the funds.   
 
The study results differ substantially from the CRA International study, which suggested 
there was relatively little industry inefficiency.  Indeed, 60 per cent of the funds were 
VRS efficient.  Some differences in the results of the two studies are expected because 
different input and output measures are used.  However, the main difference in the results 
occurs because the CRA International DEA model included benefits paid as an input and 
member coverage as an output measure.  Thus, many funds are VRS efficient because 
these two variables are highly correlated.  To test the proposition further, benefits paid 
was included as an input in the preferred model and the average VRS efficiency and CRS 
efficiency increased to 97.8 per cent and 95.3 per cent, respectively.  About 60 per cent of 
the funds were VRS efficient.
40 
 
The CRA international study must be treated with caution and scepticism because it 
provides an artificially inflated view of performance.  For example, Federation Health, 
which was the least efficient fund in this study, had an efficiency score of 95 per cent.  
Scale inefficiency, which was a major source of inefficiency for large funds in this study, 
was not a major issue in the CRA International study.  Public inquires, such as the Senate 
Committee hearings on the sale of Medibank Private, that use mis-specified DEA models 
cannot adequately inform community debate or shape public policy.   
 
Model specification is an art and not a science.  A good understanding of the production 
process for health funds is necessary to develop robust models to assess performance.  
Like any model, the models used in this study present a simplified view of the real world.  
Models cannot reflect all the factors that influence health fund performance otherwise 
they lack explanatory power.  Only those factors considered most important in the 
production process are included in the analysis. 
 
A more rigorous approach to specifying the input and output measures for health funds 
produces DEA models with fewer dimensions compared to the CRA International study.  
Consequently, the models used in this study have better explanatory power because DEA 
                                                 
39 The industry average MER was 9.5 per cent in 2004-05.  A 20 per cent increase above this benchmark is 
11.9 per cent.  Thus, funds with a MER greater than 11.9 per cent would attract the regulator’s attention. 
40 The results of this exercise are available from the authors.   38
has less trouble comparing funds with similar input and output mixes in our analysis, 
which results in a wider spread of efficiency scores.   
 
One test of the robustness of a DEA model is to examine if it makes appropriate 
comparisons.  A large health fund should not be compared to a small health fund.  
Examination of the peers and peer weights for less efficient funds in table 6 appears 
reasonable given the relatively small sample size.  For example, MBF, which a large 
fund, is compared to large funds like Medibank Private and BUPA.  Both peers have 
similar weights which suggest that MBF could benefit equally from examining the 
organisation structures and management practices of both funds to gain insights to 
improve performance.  However, the greatest source of inefficiency for MBF is scale 
inefficiency.  The MBF board and members recently agreed to merge with BUPA to form 
a fund similar in size to Medibank Private (MBF 2008).  The enlarged BUPA fund 
expects to deliver a broader range of services to members with lower unit costs, which is 
commensurate with improvements in scale efficiency.
41 
 
Table 5:  Peers and peer weights for less VRS efficient health funds 
 















































Druids NSW  CBHS Friendly Society
* 
(0.001) 




















































                                                 
41 BUPA expects to reduce its MER to 7.3 per cent three years after the merger compared to its current 
MER of 8.4 per cent and MBF’s current MER of 9 per cent (AFR 2008c).   39
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Latrobe Health Services  CBHS Friendly Society
* 
(0.797) 






*  CBHS Friendly Society
* 
(0.356) 
















































































































Notes: † denotes for profit fund. * denotes a restricted member fund. 
 
The VRS efficiency scores are regressed against service quality and certain fund 
characteristic variables.  Two funds were excluded from the analysis because PHIO did 
report statistics on their customer satisfaction.  The analysis suggests that none of these 
variables were significant at the 5 per cent level of significance.
42  This result could be 
                                                 
42 Similar results were obtained when the CRS efficiency scores are used as the dependent variable.   40
due to a degrees of freedom problem as seven explanatory variables are regressed against 
37 fund efficiency scores or the measures used do not adequately measure customer 
satisfaction and other fund characteristics or both.





Sensitivity analysis involved comparing the VRS efficiency scores of the preferred model 
to alternative models (Models 2, 3 and 4).  The alternative models  produced broadly 
similar VRS efficiency results to the preferred model.  The mean VRS efficiency scores 
for Models 2 and 3 were 0.683 and 0.684, respectively.  The mean VRS efficiency score 
for Model 4 was the lowest at 0.644.  The models produced similar rankings in VRS 
efficiency scores.  The spearman rank correlation coefficient between the VRS efficiency 
scores for the preferred model and the alternative models varied between 0.97 and 0.95. 
 
However, there are several important differences between the various models.  The 
alterative models have less VRS efficient funds than the preferred model.  The preferred 
model had 11 VRS efficient funds.  By contrast, Models 2, 3 and 4 had 8, 10 and 5 VRS 
efficient funds, respectively.  The exclusion of real total revenue from Models 2 and 4 
produced a lower number of VRS efficient funds.  This result is not unexpected as the 
preferred model has more variables than the other models.  DEA models with relatively 
higher dimensions usually produce higher measures of efficiency because the potential 
number of peers for each fund has declined.  Consequently, the mean efficiency scores 
for the alternative models are lower. 
 
The funds that were VRS efficient in the alternative models were also efficient in the 
preferred model.  Three of the six funds that were no longer efficient in some alternative 
models were close to being VRS efficient.  These funds were only inefficient in Model 4.  
However, the VRS efficiency of the remaining funds, ACA Health Benefits Fund, MBF 
Health and Mildura District Hospital Fund, declined up to 82.6 per cent, 85 per cent and 
79.5 per cent, respectively.  These are relatively large declines in efficiency which require 
more investigation if the results were to be considered in setting the productivity offsets 
for these funds. 
 
Model 4, which is similar to the PHIAC approach to assessing fund performance, had 23 
funds with VRS efficiency less than average VRS efficiency.  The average VRS 
efficiency for these funds was 0.408.  Three funds had VRS efficiency less than 25 per 
cent.  Sixteen funds had VRS efficiency less than 80 per cent of the sample average, and 
had an average VRS efficiency of 0.404.  Most of these funds were also scale inefficient 
with an average scale efficiency of 0.939.  Most funds were too small.  Four funds were 
more than 20 per cent scale inefficient.  Two of these funds were too large and two funds 
were too small.   
 
The use of frontier techniques to benchmark fund performance against best practice 
suggests greater scope for funds to improve performance through better use of resources 
                                                 
43 The results are available from the authors upon request.   41
and changes in size compared to PHIAC’s approach to compare performance against an 
industry average, which does not account for scale inefficiency.  As noted above, 




Productivity growth measures 
 
Table 6 presents the total factor productivity growth (TFPC) results for the private health 
insurance industry.  The average annual TFP growth declined over the sample period by 
1.3 per cent.  The decline in productivity growth was principally due to an average annual 
decline in technical change (TC) of 3.6 per cent.  This was partially offset by an average 
increase technical efficiency change (TEC) of 2.4 per cent per year. 
 
Table 6: Annual average TFP results, 2000-01 to 2004-05 
 
Year TEC  TC  TFPC 
2001-02 1.045  0.898  0.939 
2002-03 1.017  0.999  1.015 
2003-04 0.961  1.063  1.022 
2004-05 1.075  0.906  0.974 
Mean 1.024  0.964  0.987 
 
Table 7 presents individual fund annual productivity growth and the components of 
productivity growth for the preferred model.  14 funds had positive annual productivity 
growth over the sample period, which was due to improved efficiency.  The two funds 
with the best annual productivity growth were smaller for profit funds, which had annual 
productivity growth of 14.4 per cent and 13.7 per cent, respectively.  Two large funds, 
MBF and Medibank Private, had the next best annual productivity growth of 5.3 per cent 
and 3.3 per cent, respectively. 
 
Table 7: Annual average fund TFP results, 2000-01 to 2004-05 
 
Health fund  TEC  TC  TFPC 
ACA Health Benefits Fund
* 0.993  0.979  0.972 
Aus. Health Management Group  1.016  0.977  0.993 
AMA Health Fund
* 1.008  0.977  0.985 
Aus. Unity Health
† 1.168  0.980  1.144 
BUPA Aust.
† 1.049  0.978  1.026 
CBHS Friendly Society
* 1.000  0.943  0.943 
Cessnock District Health Benefits Fund  0.993  0.983  0.976 
Credicare Health Fund  1.043  0.963  1.005 
Defence Health
* 1.036  0.957  0.992 
Druids NSW  0.990  0.979  0.969 
Druids Vic  1.020  0.993  1.012 
                                                 
44 The reader should recall that we are assessing the potential for funds to improve efficiency through the 
potential to expand outputs whereas PHIAC assessed the potential of funds to minimise costs to produce 
given outputs.   42
Federation Health  0.935  0.960  0.898 
GMHBA 1.013  0.949  0.961 
Grand United
†   0.994  0.982  0.976 
Grand United Corporate Health
† 1.004  0.977  0.981 
HBF   0.976  0.945  0.922 
Hospitals Contribution Fund  1.010  0.954  0.964 
Health Care Insurance
* 1.014  0.960  0.973 
Healthguard   1.127  0.940  1.060 
Health Partners  1.001  0.976  0.977 
Health Insurance Fund of WA  0.991  0.966  0.956 
Latrobe Health Services  1.023  0.983  1.006 
Lysaght Peoplecare
* 0.955  0.945  0.901 
MBF 1.079  0.976  1.053 
MBF Health
† 1.194  0.953  1.137 
Medibank Private  1.067  0.968  1.033 
Mildura District Hospital Fund  1.011  0.959  0.970 
Manchester Unity  1.064  0.958  1.019 
Navy Health
* 0.983  0.958  0.942 
NIB 1.056  0.942  0.995 
Phoenix Health Fund
* 1.027  0.977  1.003 
SA Police Employees Health Fund
* 0.988  0.976  0.965 
Qld Country Health  1.050  0.911  0.995 
Qld Teachers’ Union Health Fund
* 1.097  0.978 1.072 
Railway & Transport Health Fund
* 0.930  0.951 0.884 
St Luke’s  1.054  0.974  1.027 
Teachers Federation Health
* 1.034  0.956  0.988 
Transport Health
* 1.080  0.986  1.065 
Western District Health Fund  0.908  0.938  0.852 
Mean 1.024  0.964  0.987 
Notes: † denotes a for profit fund. * denotes a restricted member fund. 
 
A prominent feature of the productivity growth results is that all the funds had negative 
technical change.  The frontier moved inwards over time because output growth was 
often considerably less than input growth for individual funds.  This result corroborates 
the importance of recent fund initiatives to focus on both expanding membership and 
reducing costs to improve productivity growth. 
 
Alternative models (i.e. Models 2, 3 and 4) were also used in a sensitivity analysis, where 
we obtained annual productivity growth of minus 1.3 per cent, minus 6.7 per cent and 
minus 6.8 per cent which is equal or worse than the productivity results for Model 1.  The 
spearman rank coefficients between the preferred model and the alterative models were 
0.97, 0.84 and 0.82, which suggests the models produce similar productivity rankings for 
the health funds. 
 
The average productivity growth measures presented above are standard unweighted 
means.  If large funds generally have better annual productivity growth than the smaller 
funds, this measure produces a biased assessment of industry performance.  To gain 
better insights of industry performance, average member coverage over the sample period 
was used to weight (geometrically) the productivity growth results in table 8.  This 
exercise suggests that industry annual productivity growth was 1.39 per cent, which is a   43
substantial improvement compared to the unweighted industry annual productivity 
growth of minus 1.3 per cent. 
 
Annual productivity growth for large funds and small funds was 1.33 per cent and  
minus 0.07 per cent, respectively.  Funds open to the public and funds with restricted 
membership had annual productivity growth of 1.55 per cent and zero per cent, 
respectively. 
 
Comparisons with productivity growth rates in other sectors of the economy are fraught 
with difficulties.  A sector can have impressive productivity growth, albeit from a low 
base, because it is undergoing reform to remove inefficiencies.  Different techniques used 
to measure productivity growth provide added challenges to making sensible 
comparisons. 
 
That said, the weighted annual productivity growth for health funds is better than the 
annual productivity of the market economy over a similar period.  The ABS (2007b) 
estimated that the annual market economy productivity growth rate over 2001 to 2006 
was 0.8 per cent (ABS 2007b).  However, there was a wide variation in performance 
among industry sectors.  Communications had annual productivity growth of 2.7 per cent 
and mining had annual productivity growth of minus 5.9 per cent.  Finance and insurance, 
which more closely aligned to the private health insurance industry, had annual 
productivity growth of 0.2 per cent. 
 
International comparisons of performance could provide more challenging benchmarks 
for the funds.  However, this exercise faces several hurdles.  First, few countries have a 
health system similar to Australia.  Thus, it is difficult to establish close international 
counterparts or peers for health funds.  Second, broader comparisons are difficult to make 
because the recent productivity studies on other insurance and banking services reviewed 
in this paper use relatively old data.  To our knowledge, neither international statistical 
agencies nor the OECD publish industry sector productivity growth estimates like those 
published by the ABS. 
 
Potential use in price regulation 
 
The following discussion provides an illustration on how the PHIAC could use the DEA 
results to encourage funds to achieve efficient management expenses.  This information, 
along with judgments on benefit payments and prudential standards, would help the 
Minister make better decisions to approve premiums.  For the purpose of this discussion 
we assume that the efficient management expenses are set over five years according to a 
CPI-X regime to be consistent with utility price determinations.  That said, there is no 
reason why incentive regulation for management expenses cannot be applied to annual 
premium reviews. 
 
Table 8 presents the illustrative X-factors for the health funds.  We solely rely on the 
results of this study to help set efficient benchmarks for management expenses as there   44
are no previous productivity studies for the health funds.
45  However, PHIAC could use 
the annual productivity growth of the finance and insurance sector or other sectors of the 
economy to help set efficient management expenses.  We assume that the regulator 
requires all funds to achieve the weighted industry average annual productivity growth 
over the next five years of 1.4 per cent.  Further, the less efficient funds have to catch up 
50 per cent of their initial VRS efficiency gap over this period.
46 
 
We assume that PHIAC uses the VRS efficiency scores to calculate the catch-up in 
efficiency for funds that are not fully efficient so that they become efficient.  The 
efficiency catch-up is one component of the X factor.  However, the Dutch energy 
regulator used CRS efficiency scores to determine the catch-up in efficiency for 
electricity firms, which were previously predominately scale inefficient.  PHIAC may 
consider a similar approach is necessary for the large health funds to achieve efficient 
management expenses.  
 
Table 8: Illustrative X-factors (%) 
 












0.552 1.4 4.1 5.5 
Aus. Unity Health
† 0.671  1.4 3.0 4.4 
BUPA Aust.








0.674 1.4 3.0 4.4 
Credicare Health 
Fund 
0.621 1.4 3.5 4.9 
Defence Health
* 1.000  1.4 0 1.4 
Druids NSW  0.361  1.4 5.7 7.1 
Druids Vic  0.434  1.4 5.1 6.5 
Federation Health  0.275  1.4 6.3 7.7 
GMHBA 0.902  1.4 0.9 2.3 
Grand United




0.399 1.4 5.4 6.8 
HBF   1.000  1.4 0 1.4 
Hospitals 
Contribution Fund 
1.000 1.4 0 1.4 
Health Care  0.653  1.4 3.2 4.6 
                                                 
45 We note that IPART (1999a) used wider industry productivity growth estimates, in conjunction with 
industry specific studies on productivity growth, to help set the productivity offset for electricity 
distributors. 
46 By comparison, the Netherlands Competition Authority required electricity businesses to fully catch-up 
to the efficient frontier over one price determination that set prices for six years.    45
Insurance
* 
Healthguard   0.559  1.4 4.0 5.4 
Health Partners  0.786  1.4 2.1 3.5 
Health Insurance 
Fund of WA 
0.562 1.4 4.1 5.5 
Latrobe Health 
Services 




0.845 1.4 1.6 3.08 
MBF 0.914  1.4 0.7 2.1 
MBF Health
† 1.000  1.4 0 1.4 
Medibank Private  1.000  1.4 0 1.4 
Mildura District 
Hospital Fund 
1.000  1.4 0 1.4 
Manchester Unity  0.483  1.4 4.7 6.1 
Navy Health
* 0.544  1.4 4.2 5.6 









0.745 1.4 2.5 3.9 
Qld Country 
Health 










0.485 1.4 4.7 6.1 




1.000 1.4 0 1.4 
Transport Health
* 1.000  1.4 0 1.4 
Western District 
Health Fund 
0.700 1.4 2.8 4.2 
Mean  0.716  1.4 2.6 4.0 
 
To demonstrate how the X-factors in table 8 were calculated consider the second fund, 
the Australian Health Management Group, which had a VRS technical efficiency score of 
0.598.  It is required to catch up (1-0.0598)/2 = 0.201 or 20.1 per cent over five years.  
The catch up is equivalent to an annual compound rate of (1.201)
1/5 or 4 per cent.  Thus 
the X–factor for the fund is 1.4 per cent plus 4 per cent which equals 5.4 per cent.  
Consequently, this fund is required to reduce real unit management expenses by 5.4 per 
annum. 
 
The X-factors vary from 1.4 per cent for the VRS efficient funds to 7.7 per cent for 
Federation Health, which is the least efficient fund.  The industry average X-factor is  
4 per cent.  Thus, premium increases could fall, on average, by about 0.4 per cent because 
management expenses are about 10 per cent of industry total costs. 
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The average X-factor is 4.6 per cent if the CRS efficiency scores are used to set the price 
cap for health insurance.  Consequently, premium increases could decline by about half a 
per cent. 
 
The benchmarking results should not be used in a prescriptive manner to set fund X-
factors because the models and the data are imperfect.  However, governments, regulators 
and business often make decisions with imperfect information.  Waiting for perfect data 
would result in lengthy delays.  That said, the results of the study are relatively robust and 
allow the regulator to frame tighter questions about variations in performance during 
premium approval process compared to the existing process to assess fund efficiency 
against an industry average.   
 
 8. Discussion and Policy Recommendations 
 
The potential to reduce premium increases 
 
The study suggests that health funds can potentially reap large productivity gains, which 
would help staunch premium increases.  On average, health funds could potentially 
increase outputs by 28 per cent given existing inputs.  Unit management expenses could 
potentially be reduced, on average, by 4 per cent per annum.  Thus, premium increases 
could potentially decline by about 0.4 per cent per annum as management expenses are 
about 10 per cent of industry total costs.  Premium increases could fall by about a half of 
a per cent per annum if health funds were encouraged to achieve scale efficiency.  Further 
reductions in premiums are possible if the hypothetical price determination period for 
funds was lowered from 5 years or the less efficient funds were required to catch up more 
than 50 per cent of their VRS efficiency gap over the price determination or both. 
 
However, these results are sensitive to the assumptions that underpin the DEA analysis.  
Further work is required to test the sensitivity of the results to choice of benchmarking 
technique.  We intend to use the SFA method to produce Malmquist productivity indexes 
for the health funds. 
 
That said, the key public policy recommendations to achieve further health fund 
productivity gains are regulatory reform of the premium approval process, health fund 
mergers and greater discipline in controlling benefit payments.  Greater public 
transparency is required on the regulatory weight given to benefits paid, management 
expenses and prudential standards during the premium approval process.  The use of 
sophisticated benchmarking techniques like DEA and SFA to help the Minister for Health 
and Ageing assess funds’ claims for premium increases would further assist the 
community to reap the additional productivity gains. 
 
Controlling benefit payments is largely achieved by the greater use of cost effective 
treatments by medical practitioners that are underpinned by rigorous scientific research 
(i.e., evidence-based medicine), and the health funds and the broader community having 
better access to information on private hospital performance, especially costs.  Hospital   47
cost increases appear to be passed straight through to the public under the current 
regulatory price controls.  Consequently, health funds and private hospitals have little 
incentive to improve performance.   
 
The National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission is currently conducting a review 
of the Australian healthcare system, which could help identify the existing rents in the 
system and the beneficiaries that appropriate the rents.  As part of the review, the 
Commission will focus on, among other things, ‘health financing [and] maximising a 
productive relationship between public and private sectors’ (Rudd and Roxon 2008, p.1).  
Value for money is a key principle developed by the Commission to help it assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the current health care system.  
 
To our knowledge, only two studies exist on private hospital performance in Australia, 
which are quite dated.  Webster, Kennedy and Johnson (1998) used several frontier 
techniques to develop measures of hospital efficiency.  The study provided inconclusive 
findings on hospital performance.   
 
The Productivity Commission (1999) assessed private hospital efficiency against several 
financial and partial productivity measures.  Real casemix-adjusted costs per separation 
acute care hospitals declined by 3 per cent over 1993-94 to 1996-97.  However, hospitals 
owned by religious organisations or charities had significantly higher real unit casemix-
adjusted costs.  Labour productivity increased by about 5 per cent over 1991-92 to  
1996-97.  The efficiency analysis suggested that for profit hospitals were more efficient 
than not for profit counterparts.  However, private hospital profits declined over the 
1990s.  For profit hospitals had superior profits relative to their not-for-profit 
counterparts.   
 
Research is required to update and benchmark the performance of private hospitals.  This 
information would assist health funds to negotiate better commercial agreements with 
private hospitals.  It would also provide prospective patients with additional information 




                                                 
47 The Council of Australian Government’s annual review of government services publishes information on 
the effectiveness and efficiency of public hospitals at the State level (SCRGSP 2007).  The 
Commonwealth, States and Territories are examining options to introduce a national system to benchmark 
individual public hospital performance.  This initiative would assist in framing the hospital funding 
agreement between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories (see AFR 2008d).   48
Medibank Private 
 
The sale of Medibank Private is a secondary issue to improving industry productivity 
growth.  Our results suggest that Medibank private is relatively efficient and for profit 
funds do not have superior performance to not-for-profit funds.  That said, the private 
health insurance market is contestable and health funds mergers are permitted.  
Therefore, there are no compelling reasons for not selling Medibank Private provided the 
sale price (net of selling costs) reflects at least the net present value of future dividend 




Incentive regulation for health funds can be introduced with minimal costs.  Most of the 
information to underpin this initiative is collected by the two health regulators.  Initial 
steps to reforming price regulation for the industry require PHIAC to improve certain 
information on fund activities, improve benchmarking approaches to assess industry 
performance and learn from the experiences other regulators that use incentive regulation 
to minimise the regulatory costs incurred by the funds and the broader community.   
 
First, PHIAC should include all capital costs in heath fund expenses.  A return on capital 
is currently not included in management expenses.  Second, it must publish price 
deflators for management expenses and premiums to help consumers, health funds, 
regulators and the broader community make better assessments about industry 
performance and the value of health insurance products.   
 
Improving the price deflator for management expenses is a relatively straight forward 
exercise.  We expect that PHIAC has access to the actual individual cost shares for fund 
management expenses, which is usually not published in its regulatory statistics.  The 
current management expense price deflator used in this study assumed that the publicly 
available industry cost sharers for 2002-03 are constant over funds and time.   
 
There is greater scope to improve the price deflator for premiums as the public 
information on individual fund premium increases funds is relatively poor.  Currently, the 
Commonwealth publishes an average premium increase for all funds and limited 
information on the average premium increase for individual funds.  The premium price 
deflator this study is based on the average premium increase across all funds.  Ideally, the 
price deflator for premiums should reflect the premium increases for individual health 
insurance products, and associated revenue shares, for individual funds.   
 
Third, PHIAC should analyse partial performance indicators over time to make 
judgments on potential productivity growth for the industry before developing advice to 
help the Minister approve premiums.  The advice should include the unit costs of the 
relative efficient peers for a health fund rather than an average industry unit cost, which is 
the current practice used by the regulator.  DEA and SFA provide additional information 
to allow funds to be benchmarked against the sample best practice.   
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PHIAC should consult with industry to establish an agreed set of partial productivity 
indicators, and to refine the DEA models presented in this paper, before benchmarking 
results be used to help set premiums.  A potential framework to guide these discussions is 
the performance measurement framework developed by the Steering Committee for the 
Review of Government Services (2007).  The committee assesses the performance of 
government services according to equity, effectiveness and efficiency considerations.  
Consequently, people can make judgments on whether increased service productivity is 
associated with an increase in service quality or better access to services by certain 
community groups.   
 
However, the results obtained from improved benchmarking methods are not be used in a 
prescriptive manner to set price caps for the health funds.  Judgment is still required to set 
premiums because models, by their nature, are imperfect.  Consequently, funds should 
have the opportunity to comment on and challenge the initial X-factors.  But they must 
provide additional information to substantiate claims that the initial price caps are too 
severe.  The opportunity for industry to review and comment on initial pricing decisions 
is standard practice in other regulated industries (e.g., water, electricity and gas). 
 
Fourth, PHIAC should consider closer ties with regulators (e.g., the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Council or the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 
of NSW) that use incentive regulation and performance assessment to set utility and 
transport prices to gain a better understanding of the major issues in implementing and 
administrating incentive regulation. 
 
Over time, the Commonwealth could consider setting premiums for five years which is 
consistent with utility price determinations.  This reform reduces the compliance costs for 
funds and provides greater business certainty and confidence to develop innovative 
products.  It also establishes an intermediary step to the eventual deregulation of private 
health insurance premiums. 
   50
References 
 
Abbot, T. (Minister for Health) 2007a, Private Health Insurance Premiums”, Media 
Release, ABB015/07, 23 February.  http://www.health.gov.au 
 
_____ 2007b, “Private Health Improvements”, Media Release, ABB043/07, 29 April. 
http://www.health.gov.au  
 
ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics) 2008, Consumer Price Index, Australia, March, 
Cat no. 6401.0, Time Series Spreadsheets, ABS, Canberra. http://www.abs.gov.au 
 
_____ 2007a, Private Hospitals 2005-06, Cat. no. 4390.0, ABS, Canberra. 
http://www.abs.gov.au 
 
_____ 2007b, “Experimental Estimates of Industry Multifactor Productivity”, 
Information Paper, Cat no. 5260.0.55.001, ABS, Canberra. http://www.abs.gov.au 
 
_____, 2006, National Health Survey 2004-05: Summary of Results, Cat. no. 4364.0, 
ABS, Canberra. http://www.abs.gov.au 
 
_____ 2000, Australian System of National Accounts: Concepts, Sources and Methods, 
Cat. no. 5216.0, ABS, Canberra. http://www.abs.gov.au 
 
AEMC (Australian Energy Markets Commission) 2008, Review of the Effectiveness of 
Competition in Electricity and Gas Retail Markets in Victoria, Second Final Report,  
29 February, Sydney. http://www.aemc.gov.au 
 
AFR (The Australian Financial Review) 2008a, “Premiums Surgery a Waste of Time”, 
12 March, p. 70. http://www.afr.com 
 
_____, 2008b, “Medibank in $300m Bid for Rival”, 13 June, p. 7. http://www.afr.com 
 
_____ 2008c, “Insurers Cite Unhealthy Medi-Bids”, 17 June, p. 19. http://www.afr.com  
 
_____ 2008d, “Health Deal Undermined”, 1 February, p. 9. http://www.afr.com 
 
Australian Government 2007, Best Practice Regulation Handbook, Canberra. 
http://www.obpr.gov.au 
 
AHIA (Australian Health Insurance Association) 2006a, “AHIA Calls for Independent 
Clinical Guidance Body in Light of Alarming Surgical Failure Rate”, Media Release,  
14 November. http://www.ahia.org.au 
 
_____, 2006b, “AHIA Calls for Clinical Testing of all Prostheses”, Media Release,  
11 October. http://www.ahia.org.au   51
 
AIHW (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare) 2007, Health Expenditure Australia 
2005-06, Health and Welfare Expenditure Series no. 30, Cat. no. HWE 37, AIHW, 
Canberra. http://www.aihw.gov.au 
 
Australian Orthopaedic Association National Joint Replacement Registry 2007, Annual 
Report, AOA, Adelaide. http://www.dmac.adelaide.edu.au 
 
Berger, A. N. and D. B. Humphrey 1997, “Efficiency of Financial Institutions: 
International Survey and Directions for Future Research”, European Journal of 
Operations Research, 98, 175-212. 
 
Carrington, R., T. J. Coelli, E. Groom 2002, “International Benchmarking for Monopoly 
Price Regulation: The Case of Australian Gas Distribution”, Journal of Regulatory 
Economics, 21, 191-216. 
 
Carrington, R., N. Puthucheary, D. Rose and S. Yaisawarng 1997, “Performance 
Measurement in Government Service Provision: The Case of Police Services in New 
South Wales, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 8, 415-430. 
 
Carrington, R., P. Connelly, and N. Puthucheary 1997, “Improving the Performance of 
NSW Government Agencies”, Economic Papers, 16, 73-87. 
 
Coelli, T. J., D. S. P. Rao, C. J. O’Donnell an G. E. Battese 2005, An Introduction to 
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, 2
nd Ed., Springer, New York. 
 
Coelli, T.J., A. Estache, S. Perelman and L. Trujillo 2003, A Primer on Efficiency 
Measurement for Utilities and Transport Regulators, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
 
CRA International 2006, The Impact of the Privatisation of Medibank Private on Private 




Coase, R. 1994, Essays on Economics and Economists, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
 
Crew, M. A. and P. R. Kleindorfer 1996, “Incentive Regulation in the United Kingdom 
and the United States”, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 9, 211-225. 
 
Cummins, J. D. and H. Zi 1998, “Comparison of Frontier Efficiency Methods: An 
Application to the US Life Insurance Industry”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 10, 
131-152. 
 
Doyle, R. (Chair) 2007, Report of the Review of Prostheses Listing Arrangements, 
Australian Government, October.  http://www.health.gov.au   52
 
Färe, R., S. Grosskopf, M. Norris and Z. Zhang (1994), “Productivity Growth, Technical 
Progress, and Efficiency Changes in Industrialised Countries”, American Economic 
Review, 84, 66-83. 
 
Färe, R., S. Grossgopf and W. L. Weber 2004, “The Effect of Risk-Based Capital 
Requirements on Profit Efficiency Banking”, Applied Economics, 36, 1731-1743. 
 
Fuentes, H.J., E. Griffell-Tatjé, and S. Perelman 2001 “A Parametric Distance Function 
Approach for Malmquist Productivity Index Estimation”, Journal of Productivity 
Analysis, 15, 79-94. 
 
Fukuyama, H. and W. L. Weber 2001, “Efficiency and Productivity Change of Non-Life 
Insurance Companies in Japan, Pacific Economic Review, 6, 129-146. 
 
Greene, W. H. and D. Segal 2004, “Profitability and Efficiency in the U.S. Life Insurance 
Industry, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 21, 229-247. 
 
Hogan, W. P. 2004, Review of Pricing Arrangements in Residential Aged Care, 
Department of Health and Ageing, Canberra. http://www.health.gov.au 
 
IC (Industry Commission) 1997, Private Health Insurance, Report no. 57, AGPS, 
Canberra. http://www.pc.gov.au 
 
IPART (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW) 2004, NSW Electricity 
Distribution Pricing 2004/05 to 2008/09, IPART, Sydney. http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au 
 
_____, 1999a, Pricing for Electricity Networks and Retail Supply, Vol. 1, IPART, 
Sydney. http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au 
 
_____, 1999b, Benchmarking the Efficiency of Australian Gas Distributors, Research 
Paper, IPART, Sydney. http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au 
 
_____, 1998, A Review of NSW Health, Report to the NSW Treasurer and Minister for 
Health, IPART, Sydney. http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au 
 
Kirkwood, J. and D. Nahm 2006, “Australian Banking Efficiency and its Relation to 
Stock Returns”, Economic Record, 82, 253-267. 
 
MBF 2008, “Federal Court Approves Merger of MBF and Bupa Australia”, Media 
Release, 14 May. http://www.mbf.com.au/AboutMBF/Mediareleases 
 
Medibank Private 2007, Annual Report. http://www.medibank.com.au 
 
_____ 2006, Annual Report. http://www.medibank.com.au 
   53
Netherlands Competition Authority 2006, ‘Addendum B to the Electricity Method 
Decision 2007-09’. http://www.dte.nl 
 
NSW Treasury 2001, Guide to Economic Performance Measurement for General 
Government Sector Agencies, Policy and Guidelines Paper, TPP 01-03, NSW Treasury, 
Sydney. http://treasury.nsw.gov.au 
 
North, D. C. 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Ofgem 2004, Electricity Distribution Price Control Review: Final Proposals, Ofgem, 
November. http://www.ofgem.gov.uk 
 
Ofwat 2004, Future Water and Sewage Charges 2005-10: Final Determinations, Ofwat. 
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk 
 
PHIAC (Private Health Insurance Administration Council) 2007a, Operations of Private 
Health Insurers Annual Report, PHIAC, Canberra. http://www.phiac.gov.au 
 
_____2007b, “Premium Increases by Insurer 2002 to 2007”. http://www.phiac.gov.au 
 
_____, 2006a, “Health Fund Premiums”, Media Release, 24 February. 
http://www.phiac.gov.au 
 
_____, 2006b, Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations Annual 
Report, PHIAC, Canberra. http://www.phiac.gov.au 
 
_____, 2005, Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations Annual Report, 
PHIAC, Canberra. http://www.phiac.gov.au 
 
_____ 2003, Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations Annual Report, 
PHIAC, Canberra. http://www.phiac.gov.au 
 
PHIO (Private Health Insurance Ombudsman), 2006, ‘Submission to Senate Standing 
Committee on Finance and Public Administration in Relation to the Medibank Private 
Sale Bill 2006’. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/fapa_ctte/medibank_sale/submissions 
 
_____ 2005, State of Health Funds Report 2005, PHIO, Sydney. http://www.phio.org.au 
 
PC (Productivity Commission) 2007, Review of Price Regulation of Airport Services, 
Report no. 40, Ausinfo, Canberra. http://www.pc.gov.au 
 
_____ 1999, Private Hospitals in Australia, Commission Research Paper, AusInfo, 
Canberra.  http://www.pc.gov.au 
   54
R. C. Ray 2007, “Are Some Indian Banks too Large? An Examination of Size Efficiency 
in Indian Banking”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 27, 41-56 
 
Roxon, N (Minister for Health and Ageing) 2008a, “Private Health Insurance Premiums 
Rise By 4.99%”, Media Release, NR 08/29, 6 March. http://www.health.gov.au 
 
_____ 2008b, “2008 Private Health Insurance Premium Round: Minister Seeks Further 
Assurances, Media Release, NR 08/25, 28 February. http://www.health.gov.au 
 
Rudd, K. [Prime Minister] and N. Roxon [Minister for Health and Ageing] (2008), 
“National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission”, Media Release, NR 08/24.  
www.nhhrc.org.au/internet/nhhrc/publishing.nsf/Content/home-1  
 
Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee (2006), Medibank Private Sale Bill 
2006 [Provisions], Final Report. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/fapa_ctte/medibank_sale/report/index.htm 
 
SCRGSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision) 2007, 
Report on Government Services 2007, Productivity Commission, Canberra. 
http://www.pc.gov.au/gsp/home 
 
SCRCSSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service 
Provision) 1997, Data Envelopment Analysis: A Technique for Measuring the Efficiency 
of Government Service Delivery, AGPS, Canberra. http://www.pc.gov.au/gsp/home 
 
Spottiswoode, C. 2000, Improving Police Performance: A New Approach to Measuring 
Police Efficiency, Public Services Productivity Panel – HM Treasury. http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk. 
 
Webster, R., S. Kennedy and L. Johnson 1998, “Comparing Techniques for Measuring 
the Efficiency and Productivity of Australian Private Hospitals”, Working Papers in 
Econometrics and Applied Statistics No.98/3, Cat no. 1351.0, ABS, Canberra. 
http://www.abs.gov.au 
 
Yarrow, G. 2008, Report on the Impact of Maintaining Price Regulation, Report to the 
Australian Energy Markets Commission, Regulatory Policy Institute, Oxford. 
http://www.aemc.gov.au 
 